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Even though compliance issues are central to taxation policies in emerging economies,
convincing empirical research on tax compliance has been scarce. Through the three
chapters of my dissertation, I bridge this gap by using detailed value added tax
(VAT) micro-data from Delhi, India.
A key advantage of VAT type systems is that they allow for corroboration of
transactions using returns of interacting firms. In chapter 1, co-author Aprajit Ma-
hajan and I evaluate the effect of a technology reform that improved the Delhi tax
authority’s ability to cross-check buyer reports against seller reports within the VAT
system. Before the technology change, such cross-checks could only be accomplished
by auditing both parties, a relatively rare and time-consuming activity. After the
policy change, the tax authority could (and did) relatively easily cross-check informa-
tion, declared by buyers with the corresponding information from sellers, directly on
its own servers without initiating an audit. We use a difference-in-difference approach
to show that the policy had a large and significant effect on wholesalers relative to
retailers. A wholesaler is more likely to sell to registered firms whereas a retailer is
more likely to sell to final customers where the paper trail breaks down. Therefore,
ii
on the output side, the self-enforcing mechanism of the VAT is more likely to break
down for retailers compared to wholesalers. We also find significant heterogeneity
with almost the entire increase being driven by changes in the behavior of the largest
tax-paying firms. This result sheds light on limits of third-party verification in a
context with limited audit resources and where the majority of firms do not remit
any tax.
In low compliance environments, a common strategy to manipulate the third-
party verification system is to establish fraudulent (“bogus”) firms. Bogus firms
help genuine firms in reducing their tax burden by issuing fake receipts. A tax
authority determines the existence of bogus firms by first filtering down based on
a few preliminary indicators, and then undertaking physical inspections. Given the
authority’s limited resources, these inspections are only done sporadically. A key
challenge in improving tax compliance then is to regularly, cheaply and reliably
identify such bogus firms. In chapter 2, coauthors Aprajit Mahajan, Ofir Reich
and I apply a machine learning classifier to the same tax dataset to identify bogus
firms which can be further targeted for physical inspections. We face a nonstandard
applied machine learning scenario. First, one-sided labels: firms that are not caught
as bogus are of unknown class: bogus or legitimate, and we need to not only use
them to train the classifier but also make predictions on them. Second, multiple
time-periods: each firm files several periodic VAT returns but its class is fixed so
prediction needs to be made at the firm, not firm-period, level. Third, point in time
simulation: we estimate the revenue saving potential of our model by simulating the
implementation of our system in the past. We do this by rolling back the data to the
state of knowledge at a specific time and calculating the revenue impact of acting
on our model’s recommendations and catching the bogus firms and estimate US$40
million in recovered revenue.
Tax authorities commonly apply size based regulations to firms. If firms are
iii
concerned about compliance costs, then such regulations create adverse incentives
for firms to stay small. These regulations also increase the monitoring effort needed
from tax officials. In the first two years of our dataset, the Delhi tax system had
multiple turnover based filing frequency thresholds. Firms with declared turnover
(in the previous year) less than |1 million had to file returns annually, between
|1 and 5 million - semiannually, between |5 and 50 million - quarterly, and more
than |50 million - monthly. In the years 3, 4 and 5 of our dataset, this turnover
based filing policy was first weakened and then completely disbanded. In chapter 3,
coauthor Jan Luksic and I first show that this policy resulted in bunching of firms
below the thresholds at all levels. Using the change in these reporting policies, we
provide further evidence that such sharp bunching indeed occurs due to the VAT
reporting frequency thresholds. Second, we calculate the VAT revenue losses due to
such bunching and document the longer-term impact of the VAT reporting frequency
thresholds. Finally, the subsequent withdrawal of the policy allows us to show that in
a regime with size-dependent reporting requirements, more frequent reporting does
not lead to greater levels of VAT collection.
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CHAPTER 1
VAT in Emerging Economies: Does Third Party
Verification Matter?
1.1 Introduction
Improving the state’s ability to tax effectively is increasingly seen as central to the
development process, and the value added tax (VAT) has been proposed as a key
tool towards accomplishing this goal.1 However, micro-empirical evidence on its
effectiveness is relatively limited.2
VAT is a broad-based tax remitted at multiple stages of production (and dis-
tribution) with taxes paid on purchases (inputs) credited against taxes withheld on
sales (output). In its most common form (known as the “invoice credit” method)
firms withhold taxes on sales (output tax) from which they deduct the taxes they
have already paid on purchases (input credits), and finally remit the difference to
the tax authority. Thus, tax revenue is collected, by the tax authority, throughout
the production chain (unlike a retail sales tax) but without distorting production
decisions (unlike a turnover tax).3
1Besley and Persson (2013).
2Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018), Naritomi (2013), Carrillo et al. (2017) and Pomeranz
(2015) discussed below are notable exceptions. See Ebrill et al. (2001) for an overview of the more
aggregate cross-country evidence on the effectiveness of the VAT.
3See International Tax Dialogue (2005) for more details.
1
The VAT system requires both parties of a transaction to report on it separately.
The parties, however, face opposed incentives: the buyer has an incentive to report
the transaction – in order to receive input credit and reduce her tax liability – while
the seller’s incentive is to lower her tax liability by not reporting the transaction.
Such opposed incentives are believed to limit the likelihood of collusion between
buyer and seller. These multiple reports also enable “third-party verification” in that
the tax authority can compare buyer reports against seller reports while inspecting
returns. This is often cited as a key advantage of the VAT. In practice, however,
there may be significant differences in the ease with which the tax authority can
verify third-party reports. For instance, as is true in the initial period of our study,
the tax authority may only be able to verify third-party reports after instituting
(costly and rare) audits in a lengthy multi-stage process.
In this paper we evaluate the effect of a policy that significantly eased the Delhi
tax authority’s ability to implement third-party verification. Delhi adopted the VAT
in 2005 but until 2012 (year 3 of our data) firms were only required to file a sin-
gle aggregated return (known as a consolidated return). The consolidated return
contained no information on transactions at the firm level so that the tax authority
could not match buyer and seller reports directly. Any matching across buyers and
sellers could only be done by initiating an audit and requesting this information from
the audited firm and all firms it had interacted with over the relevant tax-period.4
Starting in the first quarter of 2012-13 all firms were mandated to file additional,
detailed information about transactions with other firms. Specifically, firms were
4The lack of automatic cross-checking of reports appears to be a common feature of VAT systems.
For instance, this was true of the VAT system in Chile discussed in Pomeranz (2015). To the best of
our knowledge, this seems to be the case in other countries as well – e.g. tax authorities in Tanzania
and Senegal do not systematically collect transaction level information. Carrillo et al. (2017) note
that the tax authorities in Ecuador only began to collect sales and purchase data from tax-payers in
2007 and only began cross-checking reports for revenue discrepancies in 2011. Almunia et al. (2017)
note that while tax authorities in Uganda collect transaction level information, the information is
not used in any systematic manner for cross-checking reports.
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required to provide information, at the firm level, on all purchases and sales and
provide tax-identification numbers for all transacting firms. The tax authority could
now (and did) relatively easily cross-check information provided by buyers with the
corresponding information from sellers, directly on its own servers, without initiating
an audit. In case of a mismatch, notices are automatically generated and sent out
to both firms who are then required to amend their respective returns.5 These
notifications mark the first time that third-party information was used in a systematic
way by the Delhi tax authority and is likely to be adopted in other VAT regimes as
they move towards electronic return filing.
The intended goal of the policy was to reduce evasion by reducing input credit
claims and by increasing output tax withholdings. However, whether this will be the
case is ex-ante unclear since firms can collude (e.g by co-ordinating on off-the-book
transactions) to ensure matching reports, thereby subverting third-party verifica-
tion.6 Furthermore, since many firms are unregistered, i.e. do not file returns, reg-
istered firms can under- or over-report (or otherwise manipulate) transactions with
such firms without the fear of being uncovered by third-party verification.7
We attempt to understand the effects of this policy reform by focusing on com-
parisons between wholesale and retail firms. Both wholesalers and retailers face
5After a mismatch notice is generated, firms are given up to a year to resolve the mismatch.
If still unresolved, an assessment is manually carried out by an inspector. While the policy is a
significant improvement over previous practice, reconciling mismatches is still a somewhat lengthy
process. The nationwide Good and Services Tax (GST), which launched on July 1, 2017, is supposed
to further streamline this process. Under the GST regime, if mismatches are not resolved within
180 days all relevant input tax credits will be canceled.
6As has been noted, see e.g. Pomeranz (2015), the VAT system of third-party verification breaks
down at the last step since sales to final customers are not subject to third-party verification. More
generally, the system can potentially unravel upwards from any firm which is significantly under-
reporting revenues. In our setting third-party verification can break down at most nodes in the
chain since registered firms regularly interact with unregistered firms.
7In effect this means that net revenue disclosed to the authorities at every node is a choice
variable. While there is no systematic evidence on the extent of corporate tax-evasion in India,
anecdotal evidence suggests that it is high.
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comparable incentives on the purchase side – they can claim input credit only for
purchases from registered firms and post-reform the tax authority automatically ver-
ifies these claims against the corresponding counter-claims. However, by virtue of
being higher up in the production chain, a wholesaler is more likely to sell to reg-
istered firms whereas a retailer is more likely to sell to final customers from whom
no verification is possible.8 Therefore, on the output side, the VAT self-enforcement
and third-party verification mechanisms are more likely to break down for retailers
relative to wholesalers. As a result, we would expect the policy to have a stronger
effect on wholesalers relative to retailers. Our findings are consistent with this hy-
pothesis. Using a difference-in-difference strategy we show that the policy led to a
29% increase in average tax collections from wholesalers relative to retailers in real
terms. This increase was largely driven by an increase in output taxes collected by
wholesalers with no differential reduction in input credits.
However, focusing on averages masks significant heterogeneity in the effect of
the policy. Treatment effects are substantially higher for larger wholesalers (relative
to large retailers) ranked by tax remitted at baseline. A potential explanation lies
in the structure of the tax authority monitoring mechanism and the low compliance
environment. 96% of the top one percent of wholesalers are monitored by a special tax
assessment unit which focuses solely on high taxpayers. We do not find a comparable
increase in tax collections for the top one percent of retailers – 80% of whom are
also monitored by the same unit. However, unlike wholesalers the bulk of these
retailers’ sales are to unregistered firms. This suggests that targeted state capacity
by itself may be insufficient but when combined with increased information can
improve collections even in a low compliance environment.
8See Naritomi (2013) for an innovative program in Brazil that attempted to address this problem
with final customers. Note that in our setting final customers are observationally indistinguishable
from unregistered firms. In figure 1.7 we provide evidence for the claim that retailers are more
likely to sell to final customers.
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The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the relevant litera-
ture, section 1.3 summarizes a theoretical framework for understanding the empirics
as well as some background on the VAT in Delhi and the policy change of inter-
est, section 1.4 describes the data, and section 1.5 describes the empirical strategy
and the assumptions underlying our causal claims. Section 1.6 presents our results.
Section 1.7 explores likely mechanism for our reduced form results and section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Researchers have argued that VAT is harder to evade than a general sales tax for at
least three reasons.9 First, as pointed out earlier, both input sellers and intermediate
good purchasers maintain reports of transactions. In principle, this provides a reli-
able audit trail and serves as a form of third-party verification and should act as a
preventive deterrent for firms. Second, the diametrically opposed incentives between
buyer and seller should reduce the scope for collusion in these reports. Finally, taxes
are remitted at all stages of production rather than only at the retail level and this is
thought to render VAT less vulnerable to evasion relative to taxation at a single point
(e.g with a sales tax). These arguments have proved compelling to policy makers
and VAT has expanded rapidly world-wide with more than 160 countries currently
deploying this system. India introduced it in 2005. There is also now a fledgling
micro-economic literature that seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the VAT and its
various hypothesized mechanisms.
In an influential paper, Pomeranz (2015) reports results from a randomized exper-
iment in Chile that increases the perceived audit probability for a group of treatment
firms. She finds that the treatment had a much smaller effect on firms with paper
9See e.g. Agha and Haughton (1996).
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trails relative to firms without such trails (who would correspond to retailers in our
context). We view our work as complementary to this study in several ways. First,
Pomeranz’s experiment holds the tax authority’s information set constant while in-
creasing the audit probability (or the firms perception of the probability), while our
study holds the audit probabilities constant changing instead the information set
available to the tax authority and firms’ knowledge of this.10 11 Second, as Pomer-
anz notes, Chile has one of the highest tax compliance rates world-wide, while our
study takes place in a low compliance environment. This difference in contexts po-
tentially helps explain some of the differences in our results - e.g. for larger firms -
as we discuss below. Third, the policy change in our study is a permanent change
in the tax-regime which may result in different firm responses compared to a one-
time targeted intervention and we can examine the resulting changes over a two-year
horizon.
Our work is also related to the recent literature on third-party verification. Kleven
et al. (2011) show that evasion rates in Denmark are significant (approximately 40%)
for income that is non third-party verifiable and extremely low for income that is
third-party verifiable. In an earlier paper, Slemrod et al. (2001) find that audit threat
letters increase tax payments in Minnesota with the results driven by tax-payers
with income that is difficult to verify from a third party (e.g. self-employment or
farm income). In our context, firm interactions with other registered firms in both
the pre- and post-policy periods are sensu stricto third-party verifiable. However,
the act of third-party verification is automated in the post-period and our results
show that this automation differentially affected firms that reported more third-party
10In terms of cross-checking ability the Chilean tax-regime was the same as the pre-policy regime
in Delhi. The Chilean tax authority could only cross-check buyer and seller reports accurately via
an audit (except for a small fraction of firms filing on-line).
11With the caveat that firms in our study realized that they would have to co-ordinate on reports
in order to avoid a mis-match report.
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verifiable transactions. Carrillo et al. (2017) find that Ecuadorian firms increase
reported revenues when informed about revenue discrepancies (based on third-party
verification exercises undertaken by the tax authority). However, they also increase
(non third-party verifiable) reported costs by 96 cents for every dollar of increased
reported revenue. As a result, the verification exercise results in only a minor increase
in tax collections. Similarly, Slemrod et al. (2015) finds that providing credit card
sales information for sole-proprietorships to the IRS increased reported revenues by
24%. However, taxpayers offset the increased revenue reports by increasing reported
expenses – which are harder to third-party verify – and thereby reduced taxable
income.12 In our setting, non third-party verifiable purchases cannot reduce tax
liabilities so such direct strategies are not possible although we do find some evidence
consistent with collusion between some firms that has the same effect.
Our findings are also consistent with the theoretical model in Kleven et al. (2016)
in that the effects of the improved verification are most pronounced for larger whole-
sale firms.13 Our findings of differential effects for larger wholesale firms are also
complementary to the larger bunching effects documented in Almunia and Lopez-
Rodriguez (2018) for Spanish firms with more third-party verifiable transactions.
A common theme in this literature is that firms are often able to circumvent
monitoring policies by changing behavior along margins not visible to the authorities.
Therefore, the eventual intended effect of the monitoring policy on tax collections
is relatively muted. Our work is related to this literature since the policy change
we examine has differential effects on firms whose activities are less visible to the
authorities relative to firms whose transactions are more visible and that in addition
12See also Kumler et al. (2012) for an empirical study that documents improvements in payroll
tax compliance by firms as a result of a policy change that established a closer link between firm
reported wages and pensions.
13Although the model in Kleven et al. (2016) is described in terms of collusion between workers
and firms, the logic extends to collusion between firms; we discuss the relationship in greater detail
in section 1.3.
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firms can use a margin unavailable in high-compliance environments - making off the
book transactions.
We also contribute to a recent literature exploring mechanisms to improve the
state’s tax collection ability.14 Finally, our work is also relevant to the literature that
attempts to understand the role of technology in improving governance in developing
countries.15
1.3 Conceptual Framework
We organize our thinking around conceptual framework provided by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972); Kleven et al. (2011) for understanding the differential effects of the
policy reform on wholesale and retail firms and Kleven et al. (2016) for understanding
the larger effects on bigger wholesale firms.
Kleven et al. (2011) adapt the canonical Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of
tax-compliance to incorporate third-party verifiable income. The model derives the
firm’s optimal choice of reported income which in turn determines the (endogenized)
evasion detection probability. The key trade-off here is balancing the gains arising
from tax evasion by reducing reported income against the increase in the probability
of detection which is assumed to be an increasing function of the tax evaded. Further,
the probability of detection is assumed to be close to one for any evasion of third-
party verifiable income but significantly lower for non third-party verifiable income.
Consequently, tax-payers will set reported income to be at least as high as their
third-party verifiable income and will under-report the non third-party verifiable
component of income.
14See e.g. Gordon and Li (2009), Khan et al. (2016).
15See e.g. Banerjee et al. (2016), Muralidharan et al. (2016), and the review in Finan et al.
(2017).
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An implication of this model is that an increase in third-party verifiable income
will lead to an increase in reported income.16 Within the model we interpret the
automation of cross-checking buyer and seller reports as an increase in third-party
verifiable income. However, the increase is larger for wholesale firms because they
interact with a larger number of registered firms relative to retail firms.17 The model
then predicts that, ceterus paribus, collections should increase more for wholesale
firms relative to retail firms. As we shall see, tax collections from retail firms are
relatively unaffected by the reform and we discuss the implications of that finding in
the context of this model below.
This previous model takes third-party verifiable income as exogenously given.
A complementary framework is provided by Kleven et al. (2016) who examine the
choice of how much third-party verifiable income a firm will report in the context of
a cooperative game played by (potentially) colluding firms.18 In the model, a given
(henceforth the index) firm interacts with N other firms in a pairwise manner and
each pair decides on a common report to be reported separately by each member to
the tax-authority. Each member of the pair knows whether the agreed upon report is
true. If the (common) reported transaction differs from the truth, then a mismatch
report is filed with a certain probability (that is constant across pairs) to the tax-
authority.19 Such denouncement events are assumed to be independent across pairs.
16The setting here differs from the version of the Allingham-Sandmo model exposited in e.g.
Carrillo et al. (2017) in that non-third-party verifiable purchases are not eligible for input-tax
credit. This difference implies that in our setting firms will not have an incentive to respond to
an increase in third-party reported sales by increasing non-third party verifiable purchases. It is
possible for firms to reduce their tax liability by colluding with suppliers to increase their input tax
credits. We examine this possibility in the results section below.
17Shown in figure 1.7.
18The model is intended to describe the strategic considerations involved in third-party reporting
of employee wages by (a) the employer and (b) employees to the tax authority. However, with
a suitable caveat, discussed below, it can be adapted to examining third-party reporting between
firms.
19The reasons for the whistle-blowing report are left unmodeled but could represent for instance
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It then follows that the likelihood of being denounced is increasing in N . Kleven
et al. (2016) then show that evasion is decreasing in N . The key insight here is that
for a index firm, collusion is harder to maintain when interacting with more firms.
As pointed out earlier, collusion, and hence evasion, under a VAT is harder since
the seller and the buyer face opposing incentives. However, if sales can be under-
reported at any node in the VAT chain, then collusion becomes feasible at all nodes
above the under-reporting node. The basic logic is that under-reporting sales reduces
the strength of the opposing incentives between the under-reporting firm and its
suppliers, allowing for collusion.20 In particular, the declines in tax liability via
reducing reported sales can now be traded-off against the declines in input tax credit
from reducing reported purchases. The firm under-reporting sales and its buyer have
some scope for reaching an agreement on reducing reported purchases to the tax
authority. This same logic can then be extended up the VAT chain so that all nodes
above can collude and evade taxes even in the presence of third-party reporting.
In high compliance environments, the under-reporting of sales is assumed to occur
only at the point of sale to the final consumer since no third-party verification is
possible at that final node. However, in Delhi, the majority of our study firms make
some sales that are not third-party verifiable. This is because sales to unregistered
firms – i.e. firms that are not registered with the tax authority and hence do not
have to file returns– occur at all nodes of the VAT chain.21 Therefore, firms have the
potential to under-report sales at all nodes on the VAT chain. This in turn implies
that in our context the pairwise analysis of Kleven et al. (2016) can be applied to
any two adjacent nodes in the VAT chain. In particular, the pairwise analysis does
not depend upon collusion further down the chain (upto the final sale to consumer)
a breakdown in collusion, disgruntlement, error or moral concerns.
20See e.g. section 1.2 in Pomeranz (2015).
21In our study approximately 75% of firms make some positive sales to unregistered firms.
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Figure 1.1: Toy Model
Selling price=100 120 144
W M R Sale Tax(R)
Selling 
Price
100 120 144 144
Input 
Credit
0 10 12 0
Output Tax 10 12 14.4 14.4
Net Tax 10 2 2.4 14.4
Total Tax 14.4 14.4
VAT: 100*0.1=10 120*0.1=12 144*0.1=14.4
Amount Paid=132
Amount Paid=110 Amount Paid=158.4
W M R C
An illustrative example describing how a value added tax system is different from a sales tax regime.
Both the systems are revenue equivalent. In a sales tax system, the tax revenue is withheld and
remitted only from the point at which sales are made to the final customer. However, in a VAT
system, the tax revenue is withheld and remitted across all stages of production.
as is required in accounts of VAT break-down in high compliance environments.
This interpretation of the model implies that collusion, and hence tax-evasion
under third-party reporting will be lower for firms that interact with a larger number
of registered firms. Wholesale firms on average interact with more registered firms
measured both in terms of number of firms interacted with as well as the fraction of
sales that are made to registered firms when compared to retail firms. Based on the
model, we hypothesize then that tax collections should increase more for wholesalers
following the introduction of effective automated third-party verification.
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1.3.1 Illustrative Example
We next outline a simple example to explicate the working of the VAT to highlight
features relevant for a low compliance environment. Consider a production chain as
outlined in figure 1.1 consisting of three firms and a final consumer - starting with W
at the “top” of the chain on the left through to the final customer C at the “end” of
the chain. Under a standard sales tax regime with ful compliance with a tax rate of
10%, W and M do not withhold any tax. C pays $14.4 (10% of 144) to R as tax and
R is presumed to remit the entire amount to the tax authority. Now under a VAT
regime, W withholds $10 in tax from M (10% of 100), M withholds $12 in tax from
R, and R will withhold $14.4 in tax from C. Finally, W will remit $10 to the tax
authority. M, however, will declare that it has already paid $10 as tax to M and will
deduct that amount from the $12 it withheld and will remit only $2, and similarly,
R will remit only $2.4. The amount that should finally be deposited to the the tax
authority is still $14.4. Therefore, in a system with full compliance, the VAT system
collects the same tax revenue as a standard sales tax.
There are two key points worth emphasizing here. First, M (R) gets a “tax credit”
(also called “input credit”) only if W (M) is registered with the tax authority. This,
theoretically, should push firms which sell to registered firms to register themselves
and thereby reduce informality in the system. However, in practice the effectiveness
of this incentive is far from clear given the difficulties faced by developing countries
in persuading firms to become formal and in monitoring the VAT system.22 In our
study approximately 75% of firms make some some sales to unregistered firms.23
Second, as is standard in VAT systems, each firm has incentives to under-report
22Bird et al. (2005). See also De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) for a model showing that such
incentives can also create “chains” of informality.
23Note we cannot distinguish between final consumers and unregistered firms in our data. How-
ever, sales to unregistered entities occur at all nodes on a VAT chain, not just at the end point.
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sales and to over-report inputs so that a buyer and the corresponding seller have
opposed incentives. For example, in the transaction between W and M, W has an
incentive to not report the transaction to avoid remitting to the state any tax it
has withheld while M wants to report the entire amount to maximize its tax credit.
Therefore, M’s incentives should act as a check on behavior of W particularly if the
tax authority can credibly cross-verify M’s reports with W’s reports.
If, however, M can sell to unregistered firms, then the tax authority can no longer
third-party verify all of its sales. This failure of third-party verification in turn opens
up the possibility of collusion between W and M. For instance, if M sells $ 60 worth
of goods to unregistered firms (U), it can conceal this transaction completely since it
cannot be verified by third-party reporting. This in turn provides M an incentive to
collude with W to reduce reported purchases (so as to ensure that reported sales are
not lower than reported purchases). For instance, they can agree upon a purchase
amount of $50. This reduces W’s tax liability to $5 relative to the no collusion
scenario. This agreement does reduce M’s input tax credit by $5 as well. However,
since M only reports half his sales, the decline in her output tax more than off-sets
the decline in her input tax credit so that her overall tax liability falls (in this case
by 50%) from $2 to $1.24 (Refer to table 1.1)
Continuing with the example as above we can consider three different scenarios
depending upon whether M and R collude. First, we assume that there is no collusion
between R and M and R reports sales truth-fully. In this case, R sells output to final
consumers for $72 collecting $7.2 in taxes of which $6 are off-set by his input tax
credit so that $1.2 is remitted to the authority. Second, consider the case where R
and M do not collude but R decides unilaterally to under-report sales to C since such
sales are not subject to third-party verification. In this scenario, R can in principle
24Since M is not reporting the sale to U, it can give the tax-break to U by not collecting the
tax or it can withhold the tax but not remit it. Anecdotally, we are aware of both the scenarios
occurring in Delhi and we are indifferent between them.
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Table 1.1: Evasion in Toy Model
Sales Purchases Tax
Actual Reported Actual Reported Actual Reported
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
R U R U R U R U
W 100 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 10 5
M 60 60 60 0 100 0 50 0 12 -10 = 2 6-5 = 1
R 0 72 0 60 60 0 60 0 7.2-6 = 1.2 6-6 = 0
Actual columns indicate the true values of sales or purchases. Reported
columns indicate the declared values of sales or purchases. Columns (1), (3),
(5), (7) show transactions with registered firms. Columns (2), (4), (6), (8)
show transactions with registered firms. Tax evasion is feasible because M
makes half of its sales to unregistered firms.
report any amount of sales to C but perhaps recognizing that zero (or negative)
value-added in the final step may invite further scrutiny, will report the smallest
amount about $60 he is comfortable with to the tax authority. Third, M and R
have incentives to collude so that the entire transaction can be carried out without
involving another party U. In particular, M and R can agree to make $60 worth of
transactions on-the-books and remaining $60 off-the-books.
The simple example above makes two points relevant for our setting. First,
holding constant the probability of detection, sales to unregistered firms by a seller at
any point in the chain enables pairwise collusion between the seller and his immediate
supplier regardless of the presence of collusion further below (or above) the pair.
This in turn implies that we can use the Kleven et al. (2016) model to analyze
the implication of third-party reporting since we can limit attention to pairwise
comparisons of buyers and sellers and do not need to rely on “unraveling from the
bottom” arguments typically invoked to examine evasion in VAT systems. Second,
one can reasonably interpret the pre-reform status quo within the model as the
situation where no transactions had effective third-party verification and tax reports
were not matched across buyers and sellers. The imposition of automated matching
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Figure 1.2: Third Party Verification
Description of information declared by firms. For example, W will have information about M
in its SOLD TO annexure and will have no information in its PURCHASED FROM annexure.
Correspondingly, M will declare information about W in its PURCHASED FROM annexure, which
can be used to verify sales made by W.
between buyers and sellers means that the transactions between W and M and M
and R now need to be evaluated as above while the transactions between R and C
are still not third-party verifiable (see figure 1.2). This difference across W and R
firms in the effect of the policy along form the basis of our identification strategy.
1.3.2 VAT in Delhi: Policy Change
From Q1 of 2012-13 (year 3 of our data), firms were required to file two additional
forms (known as Annexure 2A and Annexure 2B) in addition to their usual consol-
idated returns (which is referred to as Form 16, appendix B.1). The main change
for our purposes is that the additional forms required firms to provide transaction
details (i.e. sales and purchase information) disaggregated at the firm and tax-rate
level for all registered firms and that the authority began to cross-check buyer and
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seller reports automatically on its own server.25
Annexure 2B recorded all firm sales in the past tax period disaggregated at the
registered buyer level for each tax rate. Annexure 2A recorded purchases disaggre-
gated at the seller level for each tax rate (refer to appendix B.2). All firm level entries
in Forms 2A and 2B had to include the tax IDs of all registered firms involved in
the transaction thus enabling the tax authority to easily cross-check reports. The
only across firm aggregation that was permissible was for unregistered firms (i.e.
firms with no tax identification numbers which includes final consumers). The new
forms meant that for the first time the tax authority could cross-check buyer and
seller reports (for dis-aggregated transactions) from the submitted returns alone (i.e.
without having to resort to an audit).26
1.4 Data
We have detailed tax data from the government of New Delhi for 5 years (from 2010
to 2015) which we describe in detail below.
1.4.1 VAT Returns
We have anonymized VAT returns for the entire universe of registered firms for
5 years - 2010-11 (Y1), 2011-12 (Y2), 2012-13 (Y3), 2013-14 (Y4), 2014-15 (Y5).
Each firm is assigned a unique identifying number so we can follow a firm over time
25Different commodities are taxed at different rates. Firm A reporting transactions with Firm
B would group together all transactions for commodities taxed at the same rate into a single
transaction report.
26Recall that before the policy change (from 2005-2012) firms did not have to provide firm-
level reports of purchases or sales but instead were only required to report total sales aggregated
across all firms and correspondingly total purchases aggregated across all registered firms (and the
corresponding purchase amount from unregistered firms). They were required to maintain firm-level
information for their own records in case of an audit - though based on the audit notice data that
we have, probability of getting audited is extremely low (less than 1%).
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as well as track its presence in other firms’ returns (from Y3 onwards). However,
anonymization implies that we cannot link the firms to any other publicly available
information on the firms.
We have detailed information on the line items in the consolidated returns (form
16) throughout the study period, and after quarter 1 of 2012-13, we have line items
of form 2A and form 2B (refer to appendix B.1 for details). For the purposes of this
paper, we use the following information from form 16:
1. Total turnover (sales) disaggregated by destination - (i) local (within state)
sales and (ii) inter-state or international sales. Local sales are taxable and
can include sales to registered firms (which are third-party verifiable) and sales
to unregistered firms (which are not third-party verifiable). However, the tax
forms do not require firms to differentiate between the two. After quarter 1 of
2012-13, we can use information in form 2A and form 2B to construct our own
measures to categorize the sales, but form 16 does not explicitly ask for this
information.
2. Total tax withheld by the firm from local sales - this is referred to as the
output tax liability. This is a tax liability and needs to be deposited with the
tax authority after the requisite adjustments – viz. the deduction of input
credits, see below.
3. Total purchases disaggregated by destination - (i) local (within state) purchases
and (ii) inter-state or international purchases. Local purchases are decomposed
into purchases to registered firms (which are third-party verifiable) and pur-
chases from unregistered firms (which are not third-party verifiable). Only
local purchases from registered firms are eligible for input tax credits.
4. Total tax paid by the firm on local purchases from registered firms - this is
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referred to as input credit. Input credit is subtracted from the firms’ output tax
liability when computing the tax the firm needs to remit to the tax authority.
5. For the three post-reform years (Y3, Y4, Y5) we also have quarterly infor-
mation on sales and purchases from forms 2A and 2B as described earlier
(appendix B.2). For each quarter and each tax-rate, sales made by a firm are
disaggregated at the (registered) firm and tax-rate level, and likewise purchases
are disaggregated at the (registered) firm and tax-rate level. Therefore, for each
firm, items (1)-(4) are available at the firm quarter and tax rate level.
6. Finally, the total tax remitted by the firm to the tax authority.
Items (1)-(4) above are further broken down by tax-rates (since different goods
are taxed at different rates) and we also observe some additional information such
as penalties, past tax credits and liabilities.
1.4.2 Firm Characteristics
In addition to tax return information we also have basic information provided by
the firm at the time of registration. We observe the date of registration, the revenue
ward (i.e. the broad, largely, geographic categorization of the firm for revenue pur-
poses), the nature of business (e.g. manufacturer, wholesaler, retail trader, exporter,
importer), the legal status of the business (e.g. proprietorship, private limited com-
pany, public sector undertaking, government corporation) as well as the other tax
schemes and acts the firm is subject to (e.g. the central excise act, service tax) and
whether a firms is registered for international trade (import or export).
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1.4.3 Audit Notices
We have information (for Y4 and Y5) audit notices sent out by the tax authority.
These dated notices identify the targeted firm and are usually the first step in a
sometimes lengthy audit procedure. We use this information to quantify the extent
to which the tax authority checks on problematic returns.
1.4.4 Sample
We limit our analysis to firms present throughout the period of study. This sub-
sample comprises 85% of all firms present in year 1 and 95% of all tax revenues
in year 1. Thus, the sample consists of the near universe of revenue generating
firms (see figure A.1 and figure A.2). We do not, therefore, address the effect of the
policy on firm registration and exit decisions. We restrict our primary sub-sample
further to firms that are exclusively wholesalers or retailers as reported on their
VAT registration forms.27 These comprise 27% of all firms present in year 1 and
44% of all tax revenues in year 1.28 However, we use larger sub-samples for some
specifications which we describe in greater detail in section 1.6. In addition, we also
provide additional data description in appendix A.1.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
We adopt a quasi-experimental approach to examine the effectiveness of the increased
information available to the tax authority.
27Given the previous selection rule this means we are restricting ourselves to firms registered in
or before 2010-11.
28In terms of year 5, these firms comprise 19% of the sample but still contribute 43% of the tax
revenues.
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1.5.1 Identification: Wholesalers vs Retailers Over Time
Relative to wholesale firms, retail firms are more likely to sell to final consumers and
conversely wholesalers are more likely to sell to registered firms.29 As pointed out
earlier, the change in filing requirements should therefore affect the two differentially.
Following the reform, the tax authority can easily cross-check wholesaler sales to
registered firms whereas previously this would only occur via an extensive and time-
consuming audit process. On the other hand, sales made by retailers (any firm
in general) to final consumers remain unaffected by the policy change. Finally,
purchases by both types of firms from registered firms should be affected equally. This
argument suggests then that if wholesalers find it harder to understate sales, then
we should expect the policy to lead to an increase in taxes remitted by wholesalers
driven by an increase in output tax declarations.30
Our identification strategy is thus a difference-in-difference approach comparing
the difference in trends between wholesalers and retailers before and and after the
policy reform. The key identifying assumptions are that the timing of the third-
party verification policy introduction is exogenous for our outcomes of interest and
that in the absence of the reform, the (counterfactual) evolution of outcomes among
wholesalers would evolve just as the (observed) evolution of outcomes among retailers
(the "parallel trends" assumption). The multiple years of data before and after the
reform allows us to look at the evolution of outcomes over relatively long time periods,
see appendix A.3.
29Verified in figure 1.7.
30See also the discussion in section 1.3 which links to the relevant theoretical literature.
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1.5.2 Model Specification
The main outcome variable is the amount of VAT remitted. However, as is typical
in these settings the dispersion in tax remitted is quite large (refer to figure A.3).31
Further, a large number of firms (roughly 49%) remit zero VAT. This implies that the
mean may not be a representative measure of central tendency and mean regression
estimates may be sensitive to outliers. We address this concern by using alterna-
tive outcome variables and estimation methods (in addition to using standard mean
regressions). Specifically, we look at linear probability model using as an outcome
an indicator variable equal to one if the VAT deposited is larger than zero (for the
extensive margin results). In addition, we also use quantile regressions and tobit
type models (although incorporating fixed-effects for a large set of firms is a compu-
tational challenge for both methods) and also estimate linear regression models over
sub-samples defined by membership in deciles of relevant firm-characteristics.
Our basic specification is
yit = αi + νt + β ∗ Postit + γ ∗ Postit ∗ I{Wholesaleri}+ it (1.1)
Postit is equal to 1 if the observation for firm i comes from the post-policy period
– years 3–5 for the annual analysis and quarters 9–20 for the quarterly analysis since
the policy was introduced between years 2 and 3 and quarters 8 and 9 – and zero
otherwise. Wholesaleri is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i self-reports as being
a wholesaler and 0 if the firm self-reports as a retailer. The νt are a full set of time
dummies and αi are firm fixed-effects. The main outcome variables of interest are
(a) an indicator for whether the firm remitted any positive amount of VAT, and (b)
the amount of VAT remitted. To dig deeper into whether the effect of the policy
31Others e.g. Pomeranz (2015) finds similar dispersion for VAT returns.
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is coming from the input side (i.e. by reducing input credits) or from the output
side (i.e. by increasing the output tax liability) we also estimate regressions using (c)
input credit claimed and (d) total output tax liability as outcomes. We also construct
a new outcome variable which is the difference between output tax liability and input
tax credits. This allows our outcome variable to be negative and takes care of the
concerns arising out of there being a mass point at zero. All the outcome variables
have been inflation adjusted to the corresponding baseline price levels i.e. outcome
variables for the annual analysis have been indexed at the 2010 level, and outcome
variables for the quarterly analysis have been indexed at the Q1-2010 level.
The parameter of interest is γ which captures the differential effect of the policy on
wholesalers relative to retailers. Under the maintained "parallel-trends" assumption,
for which we provide supportive evidence below, γ is consistently estimable using
standard fixed-effect methods. We also present more flexible specifications that allow
for time-varying differences in group means both before and after the policy reform.
In particular, we include time-dummies for each period and also interaction between
each time-dummy and a wholesaler dummy. Concretely,
yit = αi + νt + γt ∗ νt ∗ I{Wholesaleri}+ it (1.2)
Where, in addition to the firm-fixed effects αi and the set of time-dummies (rep-
resented here in the interest of brevity and clarity by νt here), we now include a
full set of time-dummies interacted with the wholesaler dummy (represented here as
νt ∗ I{Wholesaleri}). The coefficients {γs}s∈S32 are the parameters of interest and
are intended to capture the differential effect of the policy on wholesalers (relative
to retailers) in period s relative to the period immediately prior to the policy’s in-
troduction. Finally, in all analysis standard errors are clustered at the firm level. In
32S denotes the set of post-policy time periods.
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appendix A.2.1 we present additional robustness in quarterly results by adding Preit
dummy which is equal to 1 for tax quarters 7 and 8 i.e. just before the introduction
of the policy.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Description: Wholesalers vs Retailers
Our main sample comprises of 32,979 retailers and 19,515 wholesalers who file a
return during the entire period of our study.33 Pre-policy means in year 1 along
with changes in means over the pre-policy period for the two groups are shown in
table 1.2. In general, wholesalers are considerably larger than retailers; we provide
additional data description in appendix A.1 and discuss evidence of parallel trends
in section 1.6.1.1.
As mentioned earlier, these two groups account for a substantial part of VAT col-
lections. In year 1, both groups remitted 44% (|46.7 billion) of total VAT collections
and the corresponding number is 43% for the last year of the study. In total, they
account for 55.5% of the increase in the VAT collections from the sample of firms
present in each of the 5 years. Figure 1.3 and figure A.5 show the trends of VAT
remitted at the annual as well as the quarterly level for the two groups (along with
point-wise 95% confidence intervals).
1.6.1.1 Supporting Evidence for the Parallel Trends Assumption
We begin by providing some evidence that changes in the outcome variables of in-
terest were evolving similarly among wholesalers and retailers in the periods prior
33This is when returns are aggregated to the annual level. We discuss the sample size when we
consider quarterly frequency regressions in appendix A.2.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Retailer and Wholesaler Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Retailers Diff Wholesalers Diff
% Positive VAT Deposited Firms 0.59 -0.00 0.53 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VAT Deposited 0.64 0.02 1.31 -0.01
(0.06) (0.02) (0.20) (0.05)
Total Turnover 24.27 2.23 80.80 4.70
(1.31) (0.74) (6.47) (2.59)
Turnover (Local) 18.43 1.89 49.72 4.66
(1.18) (0.68) (4.45) (1.23)
Credit Claimed 0.95 0.10 1.41 0.23
(0.04) (0.01) (0.24) (0.08)
Output Tax 1.53 0.12 2.63 0.22
(0.08) (0.02) (0.41) (0.07)
Tax Remitted/TotalTurnover 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Credit/TotalTurnover 0.11 -0.07 0.07 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Output Tax/TotalTurnover 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Nonlocal Turnover/TotalTurnover 0.25 0.00 0.37 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Summary statistics for selected variables in Year 1. Amounts are in million ru-
pees, with |65 approximately equal to $1. NW = 32979, NR = 19515. 951
wholesalers and 521 retailers report zero turnover. Column (2) and Column (4)
report mean differences between real values of year 2 and year 1. Values have
been price adjusted in year 1 terms. Standard error in parenthesis.
to the reform. We examine the key outcome variable, tax remitted by firms. Fig-
ure 1.3 presents group-wise means for tax remitted in each period and figure A.6(a)
graphs the coefficients for the difference between the two groups in each period from
estimating equation (1.2). We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the changes
in tax remitted during the first two periods were the same across wholesalers and
retailers (p-value=0.61). We also carry out the same analysis at the quarterly level
(Figures A.5 and A.7(a)) which yields the same conclusions.34
This gives us some confidence that the key (untestable) assumption of parallel
34In appendix A.3.1 we describe the formal statistical tests for testing the absence of differential
pre-trends in more detail.
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Figure 1.3: Wholesalers vs Retailers: Annual Trends
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NW = 19515, NR = 32979. Average VAT remitted is in million rupees, inflation adjusted to 2010-
11 price levels, with |65 approximately equal to $1. Pointwise 95% CI included. Third party
verification started in year 3.
trends may be reasonable when examining tax remits. We also carry out the same
analysis for the other outcomes of interest: (a) Output Tax, (b) Input Credit, (c)
the Difference between the two and (d) whether any VAT was remitted. In all cases
we cannot reject the null that the changes in outcomes in the pre-policy period were
similar between the two groups.
1.6.2 Results: Difference in Difference
Figures 1.3 and A.6(a) also suggest that wholesaler tax remits increased post-policy
while retailer remits remained more or less unchanged. The regressions below for-
mally confirm these conclusions. We begin by examining changes on the “extensive”
margin – changes in whether a firm remits any tax with the tax authority – before
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Table 1.3: Diff-in-Diff: Wholesalers and Retailers (Annual)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Positive VAT VAT Remitted Tax Credit Output Tax Output Tax -
Remitted Firms Input Credit
Post*Wholesaler -0.02*** 0.38*** -0.12 0.25** 0.37***
(0.00) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14)
Post 0.04*** -0.09* 0.18*** 0.09** -0.09**
(0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Mean Dep.Var. .53 1.31 1.41 2.63 1.22
(.00) (.20) (.24) (.41) (0.20)
Observations 262,470 262,470 262,470 262,470 262,470
R-squared 0.63 0.89 0.83 0.97 0.89
Number of Firms 52,494 52,494 52,494 52,494 52,494
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level. NW = 19515, NR = 32979. Mone-
tary amounts are in million rupees, with |65 approximately equal to $1. All monetary amounts have
been inflation indexed to 2010-11 price levels. Column (1) shows linear probability regressions of the
probability of depositing a positive amount. Column (2)-(4) respectively show regression of the mean
VAT remitted by firms, input credit claimed by firms, and output tax collected by firms. To address
the concern that VAT deposited has a significant mass at zero, Column(5) shows regression of the
difference between output tax and input credit declared by firms. Mean Dep. Var. shows the mean
and standard errors for wholesaler firms in year 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
examining changes in the amount remitted. We then examine the effect of the policy
on the two key constituents of a firm’s tax obligation — input credit and output tax
liability.
Table 1.3 shows the results of the difference-in-difference regressions at the firm-
annual level. In column (1) the outcome is a dummy variable for whether the firm
remits any tax. The proportion of wholesaler firms depositing any tax goes down by
a statistically significant 2%, though this is a relatively modest decrease of 4% from
a baseline of 53%. Next, VAT remitted (column 2) increases by a substantively (and
statistically) significant |0.38m for wholesale firms. This is an increase of 29% over
a year 1 mean of |1.31m. The wholesalers response is particularly notable since it
is in start contrast to the retailer response – for retailers total tax remitted actually
decreases post-policy. These result are consistent with the conceptual framework
outlined in section 1.3. Wholesalers who have higher third-party verifiable income
and interact with more registered firms respond much more to the improvement in
third-party verification relative to retailers.
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We next examine the proximate causes of the changes in tax remitted by exam-
ining changes in output tax liability and input tax credit respectively. Consistent
with the arguments in section 1.3 we see that there is a substantive increase in the
output tax liability for wholesalers relative to retailers – a 9.5% increase from year
one. Further, we see that input credits decline for wholesalers relative to retailers
though the estimate is not significant at conventional levels. Overall, the signs of the
wholesaler response along each component dimension are then consistent with the
predictions of the framework outlined in section 1.3. Retailer behavior is somewhat
harder to rationalize. A rise in input credits is consistent with increased collusion
(to minimize tax liability) or an accurate measure of purchases if under-reporting
purchases is harder post-reform (recall retailers who under-report sales will have an
incentive to also under-report purchases to avoid having value added estimates that
are suspiciously low). We also see an increase in output tax liability for retailers
post-policy and this is somewhat unexpected, particularly since retailers make most
of their sales to unregistered firms. We explore this further in the next section when
we examine heterogeneity in returns. Column (5) examines the difference between
output tax liability and input credits and is consistent with the argument that retail-
ers are able to offset increases in output tax liability by matching increases in input
credits (as in e.g. Carrillo et al. (2017)) while wholesale firms are unable to do so.35
Finally, we note that the asymmetry between effects on input credits and output
tax liability suggests that that effects on wholesalers cannot be easily ascribed to a
differential growth account.
As a robustness check, table A.3 repeats the regressions whose results are pre-
sented in table 1.3 but at the quarterly frequency.36 The results are consistent with
35The reason Col (5) is not the same as Col (2) is because some firms have negative tax liability
and hence remit no tax.
36The sample is now reduced to 11,482 wholesalers and 15,337 retailers, as firms with less than
|5 million in turnover only had to submit returns annually or semi-annually in the first two years
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Figure 1.4: Tax Remitted by Top Percentile and Bottom 99% of Firms
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Vat deposited in million rupees, values adjusted to 2010 real terms.
Trends for VAT Deposited
Notes: This figure plots the total VAT remitted by the panel of top 1% and the bottom 99%, in
terms of VAT remitted in year 1, of wholesalers and retailers. NW = 19515, NR = 32979. Therefore,
top 1% of retailers are 329 firms and top 1% of wholesalers are 195 firms. Rest of the firms form
bottom 99%. Monetary amounts are in million rupees, inflation adjusted to 2010-11 price levels,
with |65 approximately equal to $1.
the results described at the annual frequency and so we do not discuss them here.
Moreover, as described earlier, we carry out event falsification test by looking at
coefficients on Preit ∗ I{Wholesaleri} where Preit is 1 if tax-quarter is 7 or 8 i.e. just
before the introduction of the policy. We find that pre-policy effect on wholesalers
is close to zero, precisely estimated, and statistically significant.37
of our data.
37More details in appendix A.2.1.
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Table 1.4: Diff-in-Diff: Wholesalers and Retailers (Annual, Top Percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Positive VAT VAT Remitted Input Credit Output Tax Output Tax -
Remitted Firms Input Credit
Post*Wholesaler 0.02* 34.75** -15.94 19.96** 35.90**
(0.01) (13.62) (13.38) (8.89) (14.06)
Post -0.02** -12.02** 9.31** -3.47 -12.78***
(0.01) (4.68) (4.07) (3.65) (4.46)
Mean Dep.Var. 1 100.59 36.27 138.29 102.02
(0.00) (18.55) (23.42) (39.17) (18.39)
Observations 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620
R-squared 0.42 0.88 0.84 0.98 0.88
Number of Firms 524 524 524 524 524
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level. NW = 195, NR = 329. Monetary
amounts are in million rupees, inflation adjusted to annual 2010-11 price levels, with |65 approximately
equal to $1. Column (1) shows linear probability regressions of the probability of remitting a positive
amount. Column (2)-(4) respectively show regression of the mean VAT remitted by firms, input tax
credit claimed by firms, and output tax collected by firms. To address the concern that VAT remit-
ted has a significant mass at zero, Column(5) shows regression of the difference between output tax
and input credit declared by firms. Mean Dep. Var. shows the mean and standard errors for top 1%
wholesaler firms in year 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.6.2.1 Heterogeneity
We next turn to exploring heterogeneity in our estimates. There are two main reasons
for this. First, as we saw in the previous table, there is a significant point mass at
zero for tax remitted. This suggests that exploring alternatives to mean regressions
may be a useful exercise. Further, table 1.3 indicates that while the policy had
limited extensive margin effects (i.e. on whether firms remit any tax) there were
substantive intensive margin effects, suggesting the the policy may have affected
different wholesalers differently.
We begin by examining the evolution of tax remitted for different sub-groups
of wholesalers and retailers. In particular, we partition each group into two sub-
groups ranked according to tax remitted in the first year of the study – the top
1% and the remaining 99%.38 The results are graphed in figure 1.4; two points
38We use tax remitted as the stratifying variable because it is also the variable used by the
authority to determine firms that will be examined by the special ward in charge of large tax-
payers.
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are worth noting. First, tax remits remain relatively stable for the bottom 99% of
wholesale firms as compared to the top 1%. In contrast, tax remits for retail firms
as a whole (both in the 1% as well as in the 99% sub-groups) are relatively stable
throughout the study period. This analysis suggests that it is worthwhile to examine
heterogeneity in treatment effects across different percentiles of the baseline outcome
distribution.39 In tables 1.4 and 1.5 we present the regression adjusted comparisons
of figure 1.4. There are at least three points of interest. First, the policy has no
differential effects on wholesalers relative to retailers in the bottom 99% sub-sample.
Second, the response of the top 1% of wholesalers is sharply different from that
of the top retailers. For the top retailers, input credits increase and output tax
declines modestly40 so that overall tax remits fall by 22.9% (relative to a top 1%
retailer baseline of |52.55m) after the policy. In stark contrast, input credits decline
and output tax liability increases for wholesalers (relative to top retailers) so that
post-policy overall tax deposited rises by 34% (relative to the baseline mean).
These results confirm the differential effects of the policy and also help us better
understand firm responses. First, the opposing signs and differences in magnitudes
and significance of the output tax response between top wholesalers and retailers
is consistent with the hypothesis that top wholesalers are more constrained in their
responses.41 Further, top wholesalers are both more likely to be monitored by a
special tax assessment unit and have more third-party verifiable income. In contrast,
top retailers are less likely to be monitored by the special unit and also have much less
third-party verifiable income. The lack of any differential response among the bottom
39A natural estimation method here would be to use quantile regressions. We are currently
working on implementing a stable quantile regression model with fixed effects on our data.
40The output tax response is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
41As pointed out earlier a differential growth story for top wholesalers is less plausible since input
credit and output tax respond in opposite directions while increased growth via sales would be more
likely to be reflected in increased purchases as well.
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Table 1.5: Diff-in-Diff: Wholesalers and Retailers (Annual, Bottom 99 Percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Positive VAT VAT Remitted Input Credit Output Tax Output Tax -
Remitted Firms Input Credit
Post*Wholesaler -0.02*** 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02
(0.00) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02)
Post 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Mean Dep.Var. 0.53 0.31 1.06 1.26 0.20
(0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
Observations 259,850 259,850 259,850 259,850 259,850
R-squared 0.63 0.58 0.78 0.78 0.82
Number of Firms 51,970 51,970 51,970 51,970 51,970
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level. NW = 19, 320, NR = 32, 650. Mone-
tary amounts are in million rupees, inflation adjusted to 2010-11 price levels, with |65 approximately
equal to $1. Column (1) shows linear probability regressions of the probability of remitting a positive
amount. Column (2)-(4) respectively show regression of the mean VAT remitted by firms, input tax
credit claimed by firms, and output tax collected by firms. To address the concern that VAT remitted
has a significant mass at zero, Column(5) shows regression of the difference between output tax and
input credit declared by firms. Mean Dep. Var. shows the mean and standard errors for wholesaler
firms in year 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
99% of wholesalers (relative to retailers) in turn suggests that differences in third-
party verifiable income alone (without commensurate monitoring) are not sufficient
for generating greater collections. These differential effects therefore provide some
sobering evidence on the effectiveness of the VAT at increasing collections in low
compliance environments.42 Second, retailers (both large and small) increase input
credits claimed after the policy while the wholesaler response is either much more
muted or even negative. These results are consistent with the retailers relatively
higher ability to collude with a smaller number of input supplies.
As an alternative approach we estimate equation (1.1) separately for different
deciles based on the baseline (year one) distribution of tax remitted.43 Figure 1.5
plots the coefficient of interest (γ from eq. 1.1) from each of the seven separate
regressions though we present regression results only from the regressions using the
42Almunia et al. (2017) find substantial discrepancies in third-party reports in Uganda and also
emphasize the limited enforcement capacity of the state as an important constraint. In our context,
discrepancies are less of a concern post-policy, because of automatic matching, relative to collusion.
43We constructed deciles using group-specific distributions of tax remitted in year one.
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Figure 1.5: Heterogeneity Analysis: VAT Remitted for Wholesalers vs Retailers
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Notes: This figure plots the difference between wholesalers and retailers for different deciles, based
on VAT remitted in the first year. The x axis indicates the decile. Confidence intervals at the 95%
level. NW = 32979,NR = 19515. Coefficients are in million rupees, inflation adjusted to 2010-11
price levels, with |65 approximately equal to $1.The first group consists of 4 deciles because all the
firms in that group do not remit any VAT.
top decile subsample in table 1.6.44 Figure 1.6 shows the event-study plots for the top
decile of wholesalers and retailers on VAT remitted as an outcome variable. Other
outcome variables are shown in figure A.9.
The figures and table are consistent with the earlier graph. The treatment effect
is only substantively significant for the top decile, and is relatively negligible for all
other deciles. Tax remitted by wholesalers in the top decile goes up by |3.38m, a
26.7% increase over the |12.6m remitted in year one. Given the relative stability of
retailer outcomes across deciles, the results imply that it is only the biggest whole-
salers that are driving the large increase in tax remitted in the mean regressions in
44The remaining regression results are omitted for brevity and are available upon request.
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Figure 1.6: Top Decile: VAT Remitted for Wholesalers vs Retailers
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Notes: Graphical event-study analysis of the effect of third party verification policy on wholesalers
compared to retailers. Limiting the set of wholesalers and retailers to the top 10% of each group in
terms of VAT remitted in quarter 1. Confidence intervals were constructed with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The coefficient for the wholesale group in the
quarter (-1) prior the policy is normalized to zero. The regressions include firm fixed effects and
time effects. The x axis indicates time, with quarterly observations and zero indicates the first
year of the third party verification policy. We have 20 quarters of data from 2010-11 to 2014-15.
Confidence intervals at the 95% level. NW = 1148,NR = 1533. Coefficients are in million rupees,
with inflation adjusted to Q1 2010-11 price levels, with |65 approximately equal to $1. Pretrends
are not statistically significant.
table 1.3.
There are at least two possible reasons for the differential effects on the largest
wholesalers. First, 96% of the top 1% of wholesalers in our sub-sample are assessed
by a special tax unit (known as the Key Customers Services Unit) that is tasked with
collections form large firms (the corresponding figure for the top 1% of retailers is
80%) and which has greater resources for inspection and other activities.45 Second,
45See Das-Gupta et al. (2004) for a discussion of similar units in the context of personal income
tax in India.
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Table 1.6: Diff-in-Diff for Top Decile: Wholesalers and Retailers (Annual)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Positive VAT VAT Deposited Tax Credit Output Tax Output Tax -
Remitted Firms Input Credit
Post*Wholesaler 0.02*** 3.38** -1.77 1.68 3.46**
(0.01) (1.38) (1.43) (1.04) (1.42)
Post -0.06*** -1.11** 1.00** -0.21 -1.20***
(0.00) (0.47) (0.42) (0.39) (0.45)
Mean Dep.Var. 1 12.65 6.98 19.73 12.75
(.00) (1.97) (2.40) (4.04) (1.95)
Observations 26,240 26,240 26,240 26,240 26,240
R-squared 0.41 0.89 0.84 0.97 0.89
Number of Firms 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,248
Equation (1.1) results of the effect of third party verification policy on wholesalers compared to retail-
ers. Limiting the set of wholesalers and retailers to the top 10% of each group in terms of VAT remit-
ted in year 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level. Number of wholesalers
is 1951 and number of retailers is 3297. Monetary amounts are in million rupees, inflation adjusted
to 2010-11 price levels, with |65 approximately equal to $1. Column (1) shows linear probability re-
gressions of the probability of remitting a positive amount of VAT. Column (2)-(4) respectively show
regression of the mean VAT remitted by firms, of the input tax credit claimed by firms, and the output
tax collected by firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
as we show below, the ease of third-party verification had a much larger effect on
the top 1% of wholesalers (relative to other wholesalers and retailers) since the bulk
of their sales were to other registered firms. The combination of these two factors
is consistent with the results in the table above. We are currently seeking more
information on the special ward assigned for larger firms.
1.7 Mechanism
In this section we explore potential mechanisms for the reduced form results above.
Specifically, we examine the pattern of sales made to registered firms and how it
evolved over time. This is important because the conceptual framework outlined in
section 1.3 highlighted the role of third-party verifiable transactions as a moving force
and in our context only interactions with registered firms are third-party verifiable.46
46We explore other a few other implementation details that shed light on how the policy was
actually executed on the ground in appendix A.5.
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Figure 1.7: Sales to Registered Firms
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1.7.1 Sales to Registered Firms
Figure 1.7 displays quarterly sales to registered firms as a proportion of total sales
separately for wholesalers and retailers. The graph is only from quarter 9 (year 3)
onwards because in the pre-policy period firms were only required to report a total
sales amount without further disaggregation. The lack of a complete series on this
variable also limits its use as a direct measure of formality which could be used to
examine heterogeneity (although we do present some suggestive evidence below). In
addition, changes along the extensive margin for interacting firms also complicates
the interpretation (e.g. if the policy led to more firms becoming registered). Over
the entire post-policy period wholesale firms made approximately 78% of their sales
to registered firms while the corresponding figure for retail firms is 43%.
35
Figure 1.8: Top Percentile: Sales to Registered Firms
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We next examine this proportion for the 99th and 90th percentile for each group
in figure 1.8. There are three points worth noting: First, over 90% of total sales
are made to registered firms by the top percentile of wholesale firms (and the figure
is similar, though somewhat lower for the 90th percentile). Second, a significant
proportion of sales by exclusively retail firms are made to registered firms. This is
prima facie surprising and we discuss its interpretation below. Finally, the proportion
of total sales made to registered firms is lower (≈ 20%) among the top percentile of
retail firms compared to the 90th percentile (≈ 50%), suggesting that smaller retailers
are more likely to sell to registered firms.
There are at least four potential reasons for the retailer related findings. First,
a larger retailer may in turn sell to smaller (registered) retailers. This could explain
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the results for the top percentile of retailers but would not suffice for explaining why
smaller retailers make more sales to registered firms than larger retailers.
A second possibility is that at least some of the reported sales to registered firms
by retailers are in fact fraudulent – that they are created to provide fraudulent
input credits and hence reduce tax collections.47 We are exploring this possibility
in ongoing work and in particular using network analysis to examine further the
characteristics of registered firms who make purchases from small retailers.
A third explanation is that greater under-reporting of sales to unregistered firms
by smaller retailers (relative to larger retailers) leads mechanically to smaller retailers
reporting a higher fraction of sales to registered firms relative to larger retailers. Fi-
nally, the data may be an accurate record of retailer behavior rather than a reflection
of any evasion. At the moment we do not have enough information to distinguish
between these competing explanations though we are pursuing further work here as
well.
We directly examine the relationship between the proportion of sales to registered
firms and the change in tax collections as a result of the policy change. We conduct
a triple-difference comparison by comparing the difference between wholesalers and
retailers with a higher fraction of sales to registered firms to the corresponding differ-
ence between firms with a lower fraction of sales and finally doing these comparisons
47A simple example is the following: retailer A declares a proportion of her sales to final customers
as in fact having been made to firm B. Firm A’s tax obligation does not change relative to the
counter-factual where all sales are reported as sales to final customers. On the other hand, Firm
B reduces his tax liability so that, after accounting for the probability of detection, there is an
incentive for both parties to conclude the transaction and for B to make a side payment to A.
37
Table 1.7: DiDiD: Wholesalers/Retailers; Before/After;Sales to Registered Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Positive VAT VAT Remitted Input Credit Output Tax Output Tax
Remitted - Input Credit
Post*Wholesaler*Registered Sales 0.02** 0.17** -0.04 0.12* 0.16**
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Post*Wholesaler -0.02*** 0.06** -0.01 0.05** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Post*Registered Sales 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04** 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Post 0.01** -0.07** 0.03 -0.04 -0.07**
(0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 536,380 536,380 536,380 536,380 536,380
R-squared 0.55 0.86 0.78 0.96 0.86
Number of Firms 26,819 26,819 26,819 26,819 26,819
Regressions run at the quarterly level on the set of firms that file returns in all quarters. NW = 11482,NR = 15337).
All regressions include time dummies and firm fixed-effects. Column (1) displays results from a linear probability
model where the outcome is a dummy for any VAT remitted. The outcomes in Column (2)-(4) are VAT remitted,
input credit claimed and output tax collected. The outcome in column (5) is the difference between output tax and
input credit (as one method to deal with the point mass at zero in the VAT remitted outcome). Monetary amounts
are in million rupees, inflation adjusted to 2010-11 price levels, with |65 approximately equal to $1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
before and after the policy reform for the the third difference. Specifically,
yit = αi + νt + β ∗ Postit + δ ∗ Postit ∗ PropRegisteredi
+ γ ∗ Postit ∗ I{Wholesaleri}+ λ ∗ Postit ∗ I{Wholesaleri} ∗ PropRegisteredi + it
(1.3)
In equation (1.3), in addition to what we have already described for equation (1.1),
we now also add a variable called PropRegisteredi which is the proportion of sales
declared to be made in quarter 9 (the first quarter immediately after the introduction
of the policy). Now the coefficient of interest is λ which tells us the effect of the policy
on wholesaler firms which make greater proportion of their sales to registered firms.
Another coefficient of interest is δ which shows the effect on retailers.
The central weakness with this strategy is that, as pointed out earlier, we can
construct sales to registered firms separately from total sales only in the post-policy
period. In the pre-policy phase firms were only required to report total sales (which
was the basis of their output tax liability). We use the fraction of sales made to
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registered firms in the first post-policy quarter (quarter 9) as our measure of sales
to registered firms – and hence our static measure of third-party verifiable income at
the start of the policy.
The results in table 1.7 show that the treatment effect of the automation policy is
stronger for wholesale firms who sell more to registered firms. Somewhat surprisingly,
retailers with a larger fraction of sales to registered firms do not see any differential
increases in tax remitted (or tax credits or output tax liability). This finding is
again consistent with the first three explanations and high sales to registered firms
is definitely not a feature of the actual transactions that retailers carry out.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper we evaluate the effect of a policy reform that implemented a key pillar
of the VAT system – increasing the tax authority’s ability to easily cross-check buyer
and seller reports against each other. Under the previous regime such cross-checks
could only be carried by instituting a rare, lengthy and expensive audit process. We
interpret this change in policy as one that increased the number of transactions that
were effectively third-party verifiable by the tax authority. We evaluate the effect of
this policy change in the Indian state of Delhi – a low compliance environment with a
large number of transactions being made to unregistered firms (i.e firms that do not
file returns with the tax authority) – to shed light on the effectiveness of third-party
verification in an emerging economy.
We evaluate the effect of the policy by comparing two groups of firms likely to
be differentially affected by it - wholesalers and retailers. In particular, wholesalers
are more likely to sell to registered firms relative to retailers. We hypothesize that
requiring transacting firm tax identifiers in returns should affect wholesalers more
than retailers. Further, given the invoice-credit structure of the VAT systems in
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India, we expected that the primary wholesaler response would be through increases
in output tax liability.
Our results confirm these hypotheses with wholesalers increasing tax remits by
|0.38 million (an increase of 29% relative to the pre-policy period) driven by increases
in output tax liability. We further find that increases in tax remits are concentrated
among the very largest wholesale firms, with the top 1% of firms accounting for
89.3% of the increase in tax remitted. Next, we note that 96% of wholesale firms
in the top 1% are under the jurisdiction of a special unit of the tax authority which
focuses exclusively on high tax revenue firms (the corresponding figure for retail firms
is 80%). Our results suggest that information and monitoring are complements in
that we see the strongest effect of improved third-party verification from firms that
are more likely to interact with other registered firms and are more closely monitored
by the tax authority. These results suggest a more nuanced picture of the state’s
capacity to tax and the effectiveness of third-party verification in low compliance
environments.
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CHAPTER 2
Who is Bogus? Using One-Sided Labels to Identify
Fraudulent Firms from Tax Returns
2.1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) models have been effective at automating various tasks tradi-
tionally performed by humans such as character recognition, image classification, sen-
timent analysis, translation, and fraud detection. For many of these tasks the dataset
is not constructed explicitly to provide a training set but has been re-purposed for
the ML application. Such datasets may suffer from several challenges: human error
in labeling (noisy labels); the labeled set could be not representative of the pop-
ulation (selective labels); and importantly for our application, it could record the
labels of only one class (one-sided labels). For example, re-purposing a dataset that
documents only criminal convictions (not all trials): the cases tried could be biased
(selective labels), and it could also be unknown which cases were tried but did not
end in convictions (one-sided labels). In this paper we provide solutions to some of
these problems, and others, such as multiple time-period data and in-sample predic-
tion. We do this by developing an important application on a real-world dataset:
finding fraudulent firms in the Delhi value added tax (VAT) system.
VAT implementation in many low compliance environments is plagued by firms
lowering their tax liability by generating false paper trails. This demand for false
paper trails has led to the creation of fraudulent firms that sell fake receipts to
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genuine firms. These firms are referred to as “bogus” firms or “bill traders” by the
tax authorities. A tax authority usually determines the existence of bogus firms
by first filtering down based on a few preliminary indicators, and then undertaking
physical inspections that verify if a firm is bogus or legitimate (“legit” for short).
Given the authority’s limited resources these inspections are only done sporadically.
While the true revenue implication of bogus firms is unknown, our conversations
with tax officials in Delhi (India) suggest that it might be considerable ($300 million
in Delhi alone is a commonly mentioned figure). A key challenge in improving tax
compliance then is to regularly, cheaply and reliably identify such fraudulent firms.
In this paper, we implement and evaluate an ML algorithm on the universe of tax
returns data from the Delhi tax authority to identify such bogus firms. The classifier
predicts the likelihood of a firm being bogus by using a training dataset comprising
the universe of tax returns (over 3 years) and of results from past physical inspections
of firms conducted by the tax officials. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to
systematically study and identify these fraudulent firms in an economy with weak
compliance.
We overcome several non-standard facets of the data and of our problem. First,
our dataset was not constructed for the purpose of labeling for an algorithm and
is, therefore, not a representative sample of the population. In our case, a small
fraction of all firms are inspected, those suspected by the tax authority, and so there
is a problem of selective labels Lakkaraju et al. (2017). On top of that, the tax
authority only records bogus firms that were inspected, caught and canceled, but
not firms that were inspected and found to be legitimate. Therefore, we are unable
to distinguish between firms that were inspected and found to be legitimate and firms
that were never inspected. We refer to this problem as that of one-sided labels, since
no firm can be definitively labeled as legitimate (see figure 2.1). The unlabeled firms
are (at least weakly) less likely to be bogus than those labeled bogus, and we leverage
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Figure 2.1: One Sided Labels
ᶰ
Inspection is based on the tax authority’s discretion and so are biased (selective labels). Class labels
are known only for firms both inspected and found to be bogus, not for the rest (one-sided labels).
We use all data for training, but want to predict for those firms still unlabeled.
this difference in class distribution to train a classifier. Moreover, the authority has
never identified all the bogus firms in the stock of existing VAT firms, so we want to
predict the labels of all unlabeled firms. Therefore, a standard classification approach
with a training set and out-of-sample prediction is not viable. We employ a form of
cross-validation to use the entire dataset as a training set and make predictions on
all firms in the dataset not known to be bogus.
Second, standard evaluation methods rely on a labeled test set that does not exist
in our one-sided labels context. In such a scenario, the task in which the problem is
embedded can provide relevant metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of classification
methods. In our case, the tax authority has limited resources for inspection and
so it will be able to act on only the top model recommendations. Therefore, it is
reasonable to focus on the success of our top recommendations. While considering the
performance evaluation results it is important to keep in mind that, according to tax
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officials, bogus firms are relatively rare (i.e. the class bogus is rare in the population).1
Our performance estimates remain valid regardless of the actual prevalence of bogus
firms.
Third, in order to compare our algorithm’s performance to the status quo of
manual targeting for inspection, we carry out what we call point-in-time simulation.
We estimate not only whether our model successfully predicts bogus firms, but also
whether it would have done better than the tax inspectors themselves. To do this,
we test our model’s success at a point in time within the span of our dataset. We roll
back the data to the state of knowledge at that time and generate predictions. We
then measure the performance by using more recent data. In this manner, we can
estimate the number of bogus firms our algorithm would have detected before the
tax inspectors. We calculate the revenue lost to tax evasion over the period between
when our algorithm could have targeted these firms and when they were actually
targeted and inspected - potential revenue which we estimate at several billions of
rupees (tens of millions of USD).
Finally, each firm files its returns quarterly and so supplies many data points, but
its class (bogus or legitimate) is timeless. Therefore, there are several identically-
formatted data points for each object of classification (the firm) and classification
must be made at the object level. We train a single-period model and aggregate its
predictions to the firm level. We call this approach multiple time-period prediction.
The key contributions of our work are:
• A novel solution to the classification problem with one-sided labels, where the
labels of many data points are unknown and there are definite examples only
of one class.
• Point-in-time simulation approach for evaluating real-world prediction systems.
1In future work, by closely documenting the inspection results, we intend to verify this claim.
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We evaluate the impact of our predictions by calculating how much our algo-
rithm would have increased collections by identifying bogus firms sooner than
the tax authority.
• An approach for multiple time period (or multiple data-points) prediction,
where several data points of similar format exist for each object of classification,
but prediction is made at the object level.
• An application of machine learning on a large dataset for an emerging economy
government to address an important policy problem. Our results indicate that
by using our tool the tax administration can prevent fraud up to |1-3 billion
($15-45 million).
• A proposed mechanism through which bogus firms may operate in a low com-
pliance, emerging economy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we review
the relevant literature both in economics and machine learning. In section 2.3 we
describe the basics of VAT functioning. In section 2.4 we propose the mechanism
that we think is behind the existence of bogus firms. Section 2.5 describes the
classification system we construct. In section 2.6 we evaluate the performance of our
system and present the results of our model. Finally, in section 2.7 we describe our
future goals.
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Economics
There is a recent and growing empirical literature on taxation and development. This
project fits into a strand within this literature that explores mechanisms that improve
the state’s tax collection capacity (Khan et al., 2016). In contrast to this previous
work, we examine the role of improved information utilization in increasing tax collec-
45
tions. Our paper also fits into a broader literature that seeks to improve government
performance (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011; Glewwe et al., 2010). Whereas
this literature emphasizes the role of incentives in improving performance, we hold
incentives fixed but instead improve the state’s ability to target evasion activity.
Our project is also related to a nascent literature on corruption (Olken and Pande,
2012; Duflo et al., 2013). However, rather than relaxing the government’s resource
constraints (e.g. in terms of inspections), we seek to reduce corruption by improving
the state’s ability to detect corrupt firms by using technology to better analyze data
that is already available to it. Our work also links to the “forensic economics” liter-
ature which emphasizes hidden behavior in various domains (Zitzewitz, 2012; Jacob
and Levitt, 2003; Mironov and Zhuravskaya, 2014). We hope to contribute to this
literature by identifying features that are predictive of fraudulent firms. Improving
the state’s ability to tax effectively is increasingly seen as central to the development
process and VAT has been proposed as a key tool towards accomplishing this goal.2
Our work also ties in to the emerging literature on micro-empirical investigation of
value added tax systems (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018; Mittal and Mahajan,
2017; Naritomi, 2013; Pomeranz, 2015). Although previous work has discussed VAT
evasion through fraudulent firms (Keen and Smith, 2006; Pashev, 2007), this paper
appears to be the first to systematically study and identify fraudulent firms in an
economy with weak legal and enforcement institutions.
2.2.2 Machine Learning
In recent years there has been a growing interest in using ML methods in economic
development and in developing countries. These studies cover topics such as measur-
ing poverty (Blumenstock et al., 2015; Xie et al., 2015; Chen and Nordhaus, 2011),
2See e.g. Besley and Persson (2013). See Ebrill et al. (2001) for an overview of the aggregate
cross-country evidence on the effectiveness of the VAT.
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population mapping (Deville et al., 2014), migration and mobility (Lu et al., 2016),
health and epidemiology (Wesolowski et al., 2014), financial inclusion (Björkegren
and Grissen, 2017), and program monitoring and evaluation (Wilson et al., 2015).
These studies usually harness data sources such as satellite images of luminosity at
night (Chen and Nordhaus, 2011), high resolution remote sensing (Xie et al., 2015),
mobile phone usage (Blumenstock et al., 2015; Deville et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2016;
Björkegren and Grissen, 2017), internet and social media (Llorente et al., 2015), and
small digital sensors (Wilson et al., 2015). Very few of those studies use proprietary
government data, and those that do usually do not have large scale data to benefit
from ML and big-data approaches. Furthermore, very few of those studies create a
system that can be used by developing country governments directly. To our knowl-
edge, ours is the first study to use ML on large scale tax records from an emerging
economy.
2.3 Value Added Tax
VAT is an indirect tax charged at multiple stages of production (and distribution)
with taxes paid on purchases (inputs) credited against taxes withheld on sales (out-
put). Firms withhold taxes on sales (output tax) from which they deduct the taxes
they have already paid on purchases (input credits), and finally remit the difference
to the tax authority. Thus, unlike under a retail sales tax, the tax authority collects
tax revenue throughout the production chain. The VAT system also requires both
firms involved in a transaction to report it independently allowing the tax authority
to verify sale declarations of the seller against buyer reports while inspecting returns,
known as third party verification.3
3See International Tax Dialogue (2005) for more details.Mittal and Mahajan (2017) further de-
scribes VAT compliance incentives, and evaluates a technology implementation intended to improve
compliance in Delhi.
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Figure 2.2: Stylized Example Illustrating a Value Added Tax Transaction Chain
In figure 2.2, we illustrate a simple VAT chain assuming a uniform tax rate of
10%. Firm A sells goods worth $60 to firm C. Firm C sells it ahead to Firm D at
a price of $80. Firm D finally sells to an end customer at the price of $90. In this
example, the tax authority collects tax on $90 of value added ($9 of tax at tax rate
10%). $60 of the value add ($6 tax) comes from firm A, $20 of the value add ($2 tax)
comes from firm C, and $10 of the value add ($1 tax) comes from firm D. Third-party
verification works in the following manner. All firms have to report transaction level
information. Firm C wants to report that it made a purchase of $60 from firm A as
that report reduces the tax that it would have to remit to the tax authority. As a
result, firm A would also have to declare the sale of $60 and subsequently pay the
tax on it. Similarly, firm D will make firm C report the sale of $80.
However, genuine firms may want to bypass the constraints imposed by third-
party verification by reporting fraudulent transactions with bogus firms. Given the
attention that governments in emerging economies have begun to pay to “ease of doing
business” norms, registering a firm is increasingly straightforward. These factors
have led to the emergence of bogus firms. In section 2.4, we explain the possible
mechanism through which these bogus firms operate and lead to tax evasion.
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2.4 A Mechanism of Bogus Firms
We now propose a mechanism that allows bogus firms to operate over multiple pe-
riods. In figure 2.3, we build on the stylized example by introducing the bogus firm
B. The new transactions take place only on paper (i.e. are fraudulent). The actual
transfer of goods stays the same as described in figure 2.2. Firm D diverts $40 out
of the $90 business-to-customer sales that it was actually making to the final con-
sumer to firm B and reports it as a business-to-business sale.4 Firm D can do this
because it makes sales to final consumers who are not incentivized to provide reports
of such transactions to the tax authority, and because this does not increase financial
liability of firm D to the tax authority.
Firm B then can sell the input credit it now has to firm A by showing a sale of
an amount weakly greater than $40 to firm A. The value add of firm A is now $19
instead of the true value which should be $60.5 Value added by bogus firm B is $1,
and firm C and firm D have the same value added as earlier. The final value added
in the system now is $40 less relative to a fully compliant system. The surplus (tax
evaded) can potentially be divided between the offending firms, i.e. A, B (bogus),
and D.
A few key observations need to be highlighted. First, firm A and firm D do not
need to be in the same transaction chain. It is not necessary for the eventual chain
of transactions to be circular. Firm C does not benefit from the bogus transactions
and need not even know about them.6 Second, bogus firm B can make sales to any
firm which is in need of input credits. It does not necessarily need to make such
4Firm B may make a side payment to firm D as a small kickback for violating the law by
misreporting.
5Firm A will be willing to make significant payments to firm B as this reduces firm A’s tax
liability.
6We include firm C to highlight that such transactions can co-exist around genuine transactions.
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Figure 2.3: An Example Showing How Bogus Firms Facilitate Tax Evasion
How VAT evasion works
Firm A Firm C Firm D Consumer
$60 $80
Pays tax on
$60
60-41=$19
$90
$50
$41
Pays tax on 
41-40=$1
Government receives tax on $50 value added. Surplus is divided between offenders. 
Bogus Firm B
$40
Pays tax on
80-60=$20
Pays tax on
90-80=$10
kickbacks payments
Firm A and Firm D need not necessarily be in the same chain. Bogus firms can make sales to any
firm which needs input credits.
sales to firm A which is at the beginning of the transaction chain. Third, we believe
that once detected it is not complicated to verify that firm B is bogus. It is a fake
firm which should not exist physically at the address submitted to the tax authority.7
Therefore, there is no need to rigorously analyze its business related paperwork (high
effort) and a visit to the location (relatively low effort) should be sufficient. Finally,
after identifying bogus firm B, the revenue can only be recovered if the authority
pursues firm A and reverses the input credit that firm A has claimed. Any kind of a
penalty only on firm B does not recoup the revenue loss. We now describe the design
of our system.
7In subsequent field work we can test this assumption.
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2.5 System Description
2.5.1 Data
Our dataset has almost 3 years of quarterly VAT returns from the National Capital
Territory of Delhi, India from 2012-13 to 2014-15 (with personal identifying informa-
tion removed). This includes consolidated returns as well as transaction level infor-
mation filed by an unbalanced panel of firms, |Firms| = 315, 191, and a list of firms
that were previously found to be bogus by the tax authority, |inspected&bogus| =
538. Returns are filed quarterly so we should ideally have data from 12 quarters.
However, for the fourth quarter of 2012-13 the transaction level records are unus-
able and therefore we drop that quarter from our analysis, which leaves us with
data from 11 quarters. We denote these as follows. Returnsf,t for firm f ∈ Firms
in quarter t ∈ Q(f) ⊆ Q ≡ {1, 2, 3, 5, ...12}, where firm f operated in quarters
Q(f) (t=4 was dropped). Every firm is either bogus or legitimate and this doesn’t
change over time:classf ∈ {bogus, legit}.8 Some firms were inspected: inspectedf ∈
{True, False} and of those inspected some were bogus and some legitimate, but this
is recorded in our data only for the ones that were found to be bogus.
labelf = yf =

bogus, if inspectedf and classf = bogus
unlabeled, if inspectedf and classf = legit
unlabeled, if not inspectedf
When a bogus firm is inspected at time T, it is caught and stops operating,
max(Q(f)) = T . Due to confidentiality concerns, the personally identifiable infor-
mation has been removed and each firm is assigned a unique identifying number so
8This is an assumption, but we have good reason to believe it from discussions with the tax
authority and since there are sanctions against owners of bogus firms that are found, so owners
would not use their legitimate companies for this purpose.
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that we can follow a firm over time as well as track its presence in other firms’ returns.
However, we cannot link the returns to any other publicly available information on
the firms. We have detailed information on the line items in the consolidated returns,
Returnsf,t, as well as line items from annexures, Transactionsf,t, where each firm
reports the total purchases it made from (and sales to) each other firm at each tax
rate level for that quarter.
In addition to tax return information we also have access to basic information
provided by the firm at the time of registration, Profilef . Firms are mandated to
keep this information updated. We observe the date of registration, the revenue ward
(broad geographic location of the firm), the nature of business (e.g. manufacturer,
wholesaler, retailer), its legal status (e.g. proprietorship, private limited company),
the other tax schemes and acts it is subject to (e.g. central excise act) and whether
it is registered for international trade (import or export).
2.5.2 Features
Our unit of observation is the firm-quarter level. We have an observation for each
firm in each quarter in which it filed a return: firm A in quarter 1, firm A in quarter 2,
firm B in quarter 1, firm B in quarter 2, etc. We ensure that none of the features use
data from different time periods - they are all within the quarterly observation. We
detail them in this section. In section 2.5.6 we describe how we use the firm-quarter
level observations to make predictions at the firm level.
Some of our features rely on domain expertise or anecdotes from the tax authority.
For example, “VAT/Turnover ratio” is the ratio of tax paid to total turnover. To
illustrate why this feature might be predictive, in figure 2.3, if firm B reported value
add of $2 instead of $1, it would have to pay VAT for that added dollar and will also
have to reduce firm A’s fake input credits by $1. Firm B is not actually carrying out
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any trade, and is relying on the arbitrage between firm D and firm A to make money.
This implies that it wants to minimize its declared value add or, equivalently, have
a low ratio between tax paid (proportional to profit) and total turnover.
Another example of a feature we hypothesize to be predictive is the proportion
of sales a firm makes to unregistered firms - these could be small firms that are not
subject to reporting or they could be final customers. An unregistered firm does
not claim input credits and so cannot benefit from the services of bogus firms. We
would accordingly expect bogus firms to report selling a very small share of their
sales to unregistered firms, and this is borne out in our (admittedly selected) data.
Our features can be divided into 3 broad sets:
Xf,t = featureExtraction(Profilef , Returnsf,t, T ransactionsf,t)
First is the set of profile features which come from the registration information
provided by the firms. The second set of features come from the quarterly con-
solidated returns that each firm has to file. These include variables such as total
turnover, within-state turnover, the amount of VAT that was actually paid, etc. Fi-
nally, the third set of features come from the annexures that firms have to file along
with the consolidated returns.9 These annexures cross-reference the firm’s declara-
tions of their transactions, who it sold to, and how much that other firm reported
buying back. Using these annexures, we create variables such as discrepancies in
reporting between clients and suppliers, the weighted VAT/Turnover ratio of client
firms, the weighted VAT/Turnover ratio of supplying firms, share of sales made to
biggest client, and network features such as PageRank etc.
We refrain from using the class labels of neighbors in the network in our fea-
tures because it would compromise the estimates of performance by creating leakage
9Based on our interactions with various tax officials, tax administrations in general do not have
the capacity to rigorously use the transaction level information that is now available to them. They
mostly use it only for third-party verification purposes.
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between training and test set, and also because we would need a point-in-time sim-
ulation to train this, since only the class labels of firms caught before a certain time
period can be used as a feature when training for that time period, otherwise we
create leakage from the future to the past.
2.5.3 Class Labels
In this section we describe how class labels are constructed from our data, and the
problems this poses.
2.5.3.1 Selective Labels - Biased Training Set
The labels in our training set come from a list of firms that were targeted for in-
spection by the tax department, inspected, found to be bogus, and subsequently had
their registration canceled. This procedure creates a biased training set as the firms
targeted for inspection are not random - in fact they were chosen explicitly by the
tax department as suspicious of being bogus, so are not representative of the gen-
eral population (see figure 2.1). This is the selective labels problem Lakkaraju et al.
(2017). We do not have a way of completely eliminating the effect of this bias on
performance. However, we evaluate our performance in a way that produces bounds
which are not affected by this bias. In the future we plan to carry out inspections
based on our model’s predictions, which would provide an unbiased performance
estimate.
2.5.3.2 One-sided Labels
A more serious problem with our labels is that among the inspected firms we do not
have records of which firms were found to be legitimate, and so not canceled. This
is because the tax authorities do not keep records of which firms were inspected,
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only which ones were found to be bogus and canceled. In our data, we are unable
to distinguish the legitimate but inspected firms from those never inspected. Our
labels are thus one-sided: we have firms that we know to be bogus - those canceled,
and firms that we do not know for sure but are likely to be legitimate - all the
rest. To further clarify the difference between selective and one-sided labels, if the
tax authority randomly sampled firms for inspection, this would solve the selective
labels problem but the labels might still be one-sided if they only recorded the firms
found bogus.
The unlabeled firms are likely legitimate since the base rate of bogus firms in the
population is not very high, though we do not know it precisely. However, they are
not all legitimate as evidenced by many firms in the data being caught as bogus only
after operating and facilitating tax evasion for many quarters. Therefore, we do not
have a labeled training set (see figure 2.1). This is related, though not the same, as
the problem of classification with noisy labels (Liu and Tao, 2016; Natarajan et al.,
2013).
We define classes for all our observations in the following way. In our outcome
variable, we classify firms that were found to be bogus as 1 (“bogus”) and the rest
of the firms, whether never inspected or those that were inspected, found to be
legitimate and not recorded, as 0 (“probably legit”). This is an acceptable starting
point as bogus firms are rare in the unlabeled set. These are two classes so it seems
we can solve a standard classification problem but that is not the case. There is
no out-of-sample prediction to be made on some other firms that are not already
labeled by this process. We are interested in predictions on the “probably legit”
firms, since some of them may actually be bogus and we would like to target them
for inspections. We will detail our solution in section 2.5.5 and section 2.6. While our
classifiers would fit to predict inspected and bogus firms (selective labels), as in our
training data, these are nonetheless bogus firms that they are finding. Additionally,
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of Different Classifiers
even training on the selective set, the classifiers might learn from features not used
by the tax officials and improve performance for all bogus firms.
2.5.3.3 Multiple Time Periods
For each firm, the class does not change over time - a firm does not start legitimate
and become bogus, or the other way around. However, a firm is supposed to file
a return every quarter. We use our classification of firms to classify all quarterly
observations of that firm with the class of the firm: “bogus” or “probably legit”.
yf,t = yf ∈ {bogus, legit}.
2.5.4 Classifier
We use a Random Forest Liaw et al. (2002) classifier with n_trees = 200,
stopping_rounds = 2, and max_tree_depth = 20 (the maximum depth is rarely
reached in practice since the tree bifurcation stops when too few classification ex-
amples are left in a leaf) in H2O python implementation team (2015). We selected
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Figure 2.5: Cross-validated Prediction Procedure
Random Forest for its ability to handle complex dependencies between features (since
not all our features are independently predictive) and combine categorical variables
together with continuous variables seamlessly.
We perform a comparison of the performance of different classifiers to see if our
results are sensitive to the choice of classification algorithm. Figure 2.4 shows our
results: a few standard classification algorithms obtain similar performance. For
the top 400, 800 or 1200 recommendations Random Forest performs best. The one
algorithm which performs worse than others is Naive Bayes, which is unsurprising
since many of the features we use are not independent and since the algorithm
implementation we used also assumes Gaussian distribution for numerical features
conditional on class team (2018), which does not hold with our numerical features.
2.5.5 Cross-Validated Predictions
We have preliminarily classified all our dataset to “bogus” and “probably legit”, as
explained in the section 2.5.3.2, and so it would seem that there is no more need for
in-sample predictions to target inspections. However, for our real-world application,
we want the model to help target inspections of existing unlabeled firms. Of the
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firms we classify as “probably legit”, some are bogus and we want to find them. If
we trained a classifier on all the observations (classes “bogus” vs. “probably legit”)
and then made predictions on the “probably legit” firms, we would be overfitting
as a result of leakage since our model would train on certain examples and then be
used to make a prediction on one of those same examples. This problem comes up
in cases of prediction using noisy labels, where it is required to make predictions on
the noisily-labeled data that is used for training.
To avoid this, we carry out cross-validated holdout predictions. We randomly
divide our data into 8 folds. We also ensure that all quarterly observations of a firm
are within the same fold, which is crucial to avoid a different type of leakage across
time-periods. Formally, for each firm we draw a fold: foldf ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 7}. We di-
vide our data into these folds: Foldj = {(Xf,t, yf )|f ∈ Firms, t ∈ Q(f), foldf = j}.
We generate predictions for all of our sample by performing 8-fold cross-validation:
train on 7 folds with classes “bogus” vs. “probably legit” and make predictions on
the remaining fold. We then save those holdout predictions for all of the folds - for
each fold from when it was the validation fold. In this way we generate predictions
for our entire dataset (see figure 2.5). To obtain predictions for firm f :
1. Train on all other folds: Model.train(
⋃
j 6=foldf Foldj)
2. Make prediction: yˆf,t = Model.predict(Xf,t)
To evaluate performance, we will compare those predictions yˆf,t to the known
classes yf (see section 2.6). To target inspections, we plan to discard predictions for
firms that are known to be bogus (since they were already canceled), and focus on
the ones remaining with the highest model-predicted likelihood of being bogus.
More than 8 folds would make for better predictions, but increase computational
expense. Increasing the number of folds from 8 to 16 would increase the size of
the training set from 7/8 to 15/16 - an increase of 7% - but more than double the
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Figure 2.6: Generating Firm Level Predictions from Firm-Quarter Level Data Points
computation time. The extreme ideal for prediction would be leave-one-out, which
would be computationally unfeasible on our dataset. Our method is not specific to
the context of bogus firms, but can be used in any scenario with noisy labels and in
need of in-sample prediction.
2.5.6 Multi-Period Model
Each firm operates and files returns every quarter, and so we have multiple ob-
servations for each firm f - one for each quarter - with different feature values
{(Xf,t, yf )|t ∈ Q(f)}. However, a firm is either bogus or not and this does not
change with time, so predictions should be made for a firm, yˆf , not a firm in a
specific quarter, yˆf,t. So we need to consider these different feature values but pro-
duce one prediction per firm. We do this in three steps. First, we train a single-
period model on firm-quarter observations. Second, we use the single-period model
to make predictions for all firm-quarter observations, {yˆf,t}. Third, we aggregate
the firm-quarter predictions to the firm level to produce a single prediction per firm,
yˆf = Aggregate({yˆf,t|t ∈ Q(f)}) (see figure 2.6). For generality, we describe this
situation as if we have full labels and separate trainingSet and testSet, but we
combine this approach with our approach for one-sided labels.
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2.5.6.1 Single-Period Model
Each firm f has multiple firm-quarter data points, all classified according to the class
of that firm. We use all these points to train a single-period model:
Model.train({(Xf,t, yf )|f ∈ trainingSet})
In our case, trainingSet is simply all folds other than the one to which firm f be-
longs. Rather than taking only one observation per firm or re-weighting them so
that each firm has equal total weight, this model is unaware of the fact that different
observations belong to the same firm (or to different quarters) and treats them all
independently (see left panel in figure 2.6). This might affect performance depend-
ing on the behavior of the same firm in different quarters and how much marginal
information each observation adds to the classification problem. If features in dif-
ferent quarters by the same firm are identical, then our procedure only introduces
unbalanced duplication. If they are different, then different time-periods add valu-
able training examples that are all separate pieces of evidence for what bogus firms
look like and our procedure is justified. Our procedure may also result in biased data
based on whether firms were caught early or late, since those caught later operate in
more quarters and so have more data points on which to train on and would influence
the classifier more.
2.5.6.2 Single-Period Predictions
We use our single-period model to make predictions on firm-quarter observations:
yˆf,t = Model.predict(Xf,t)
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The model is unaware of the fact that different observations may belong to the same
firm. These predictions are model-predicted probabilities of being bogus - numbers
between 0 and 1, where 1 is certainty of being bogus, and 0 is certainty of being
legitimate. In this way we generate predictions for all the observations, using for
each firm all folds that do not contain that firm as described in section 2.5.5 (see
right panel in figure 2.6).
2.5.6.3 Aggregating Predictions to The Firm-Level
Eventually, we want to make a single prediction for a firm by combining the infor-
mation available across quarters. We do this by aggregating the single-period model-
predicted probabilities at the firm level to create final predictions (see figure 2.6 right
panel):
yˆf = Aggregate({yˆf,t|t ∈ Q(f)})
We experimented with different functions for aggregating single-period predic-
tions. For example, if a firm’s single-period predictions were 0.1, 0.2, 0.6 then the
arithmetic mean aggregating function would produce a score of 0.3, whereas the
maximum aggregating function (maximum model-predicted probability of being bo-
gus across periods) would produce 0.6. In practice, the arithmetic mean works best,
only slightly ahead of the maximum score function. We therefore end up using the
arithmetic mean as our aggregating function. Other functions that we tried were
“take the score of the first (last) period for that firm”, and “maximal (minimal) score
for that firm across all periods”.
There are other approaches that can potentially address the multiple time period
problem. For example, aggregating the features before generating predictions instead
of aggregating predictions, or treating each firm as a single observation and the list
of its quarterly VAT returns as the corresponding feature vector. All approaches
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Table 2.1: Model Performance on Top Recommendations
Inspection Firms Total Bogus Bogus Firms
Group Inspected Firms Caught Caught/Inspection
1 - 400 400 305 0.76
401 - 800 400 48 0.12
801 - 1200 400 24 0.06
1201 - 2500 1300 29 0.02
2501 - rest 313229 132 0.00
Using data from all time periods and cross-validated predictions.
have their own challenges and we picked the one that we seemed least problematic.
If we aggregate feature values before generating the predictions, we might end up
losing the variation in multiple observations of the same feature. If we combined all
quarters to ensure that each firm had a single observation, then the same feature
across time will be treated independently, so in effect we’re reducing the number of
points in the training set. Moreover, entry and exit of firms in different time periods
will result in the dataset having a lot of NULL values.
Our chosen approach is not specific to multiple time periods. It is applicable
whenever there are several identical-format data points for each object of classifi-
cation (the firm, in our case) but classification must be made at the object level.
For example, different doctor visits per patient, or fraud detection based on multi-
ple online purchases by the same customer, or many monthly behaviors of the same
object.
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2.6 Evaluation of Performance
2.6.1 Top Recommendations
We are constrained by the number of firms the tax authorities can physically inspect,
and so we aim to provide a ranked list of suspicious firms. Performance on other parts
of the distribution has no real world implications. We rank our firms in descending
order of model-predicted likelihood: rank(f1) ≤ rank(f2) iff yˆf1 ≥ yˆf2. rank(f) ∈
N. We take a few realistic numbers of top recommendations and check our model’s
success on those - of these top N firms predicted to be bogus by our model, how many
are known to be bogus? Formally, bogus in top N = |{f |rank(f) ≤ N, yf = bogus}|.
Of our top 400 most suspicious firms, we find 75% to be actually bogus. Of the
next 400 - 12% are actually bogus. Of the next 400 - 6%, of the next 1300 - 3%, and
of the general population - a negligible fraction (see table 2.1). Our model finds more
than 75% of firms labeled “bogus” in the top 2,500 recommendations - less than 1%
of firms, which is very good performance. Moreover, recall that the “probably legit”
firms in this dataset are not necessarily legitimate - they could be bogus unknown
to us because they were not inspected - so these numbers for the true-bogus rate in
N inspections are underestimates. See figure 2.7 for more fine-grained results on the
top 1000 recommendations.
2.6.2 Top Recommendations - Maximizing Revenue
From tax authority’s perspective, we want to maximize expected revenue captured,
and not merely the likelihood of finding a bogus firm. Small firms will only account
for a small amount of tax evaded, and larger bogus firms will account for a much
larger amount.10 We would therefore want a different ranking, in descending order
10More precisely, this is determined by the amount of tax input credits claimed, the $40 in the
stylized example above.
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Figure 2.7: Model Performance on Top 1000 Recommendations
Using cross-validated predictions on all time periods. The x value is the rank N of suspicious firms
and the y value is the number of firms out of those N that are bogus. The dashed y=x line indicates
perfect performance, i.e. every firm inspected is bogus. Model performance is near-perfect for the
first 250 predictions, then starts to level off.
of expected recovered revenue and not of model-predicted likelihood of being bogus.
We use the following procedure to make such recommendations.
First, calibrate the model, so its score is an unbiased estimate of the actual
probability of being bogus: E[yf |yˆf ≈ a] ≈ a. For example, of firms with model
score of 0.1, about 1 in 10 should be bogus, for those with model score 0.01 about 1
in 100 should be bogus, etc. This is not automatically the case for predictive models
(e.g. Naive Bayes, which tends to extremes with more and more dependent features).
Our model turns out to be very well calibrated (results not reported).
Second, calculate expected revenue recaptured by taking the amount of input tax
credits the suspicious firms claim (as depicted in figure 2.3) as the lost revenue to be
recaptured, and multiplying it by the calibrated model score as the probability of a
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Figure 2.8: Betas Curves for Different Feature Sets
The beta curve is 1 minus the ROC curve. As we vary the classification threshold, the x value
tracks the fraction of “probably legit” firms that will be insulted by getting inspected (βbogus); the
y value tracks the fraction of bogus firms that will be missed by being classified as legit (βlegit). A
lower curve indicates better performance.
firm being bogus: ExpectedRevenuef = yˆf · InputCreditsf . We then rank all firms
in descending order of the expected revenue captured, and recommend the top ones.
On our data the performance of this method in terms of revenue is comparable to
the earlier described method and therefore we do not report the results.
2.6.3 Different Feature Sets
We have constructed 3 distinct feature sets which we use together in our model:
features constructed from the individual firm’s returns (Returnsf,t), features con-
structed from the firm’s dealer profile (Profilef ), and features constructed from the
network of firms and their trading partners (Transactionsf,t). We now disaggregate
those feature sets and evaluate the performance of the model with each possible
combination of feature sets. See figure 2.8 for the results. There is a three-way tie
between feature sets that contain Profilef and one other feature set, so that the
addition of the third one makes no discernible difference.
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2.6.4 Point In Time Simulation
Our performance estimates so far may seem unrealistic. If we use our model in a
real-world scenario, we will not have access to all returns by all firms and will not be
required to predict retroactively which firms were caught as bogus and which were
not. In a realistic scenario, we would have the returns of all firms up to a certain
point in time, and would have to predict which of the firms still operating are likely
to be bogus and need to be inspected. Some of those inspected would actually turn
out to be bogus. We therefore propose another metric to gauge our performance:
point-in-time simulation.
We build a model based on the state of knowledge and data at a certain point
in time T, when the returns for quarter T have been filed but inspections between
quarters T and T+1 were not yet performed. We blind our model to all information
in the dataset obtained after time T - we do not consider “future” tax returns of
firms from times greater than T. For our training purposes we only use firms that
had already been classified as bogus and canceled by time T. This means that bogus
firms caught after time T are classified in the training set as legit. We argue that
this strategy simulates the state of knowledge and data at time T (figure 2.9, a panel
describing T=3).
SimulationTrainingSetT = {(Xf,t, y˜f,T )|t ≤ T}
y˜f,T =

bogus, if yf = bogus and max(Q(f)) ≤ T − 1
legit, if yf = bogus and max(Q(f)) ≥ T
legit, if yf = legit
SimulationTestSetT = {(Xf,t, yf )|t ≤ T,max(Q(f)) ≥ T}
We then run our prediction algorithm on this state of the data to generate top
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Figure 2.9: Illustration of Point-in-time Simulation at T=3
recommendations for firms still operating at time T. We evaluate performance by
using, for the validation set, the real class of firms which were later caught as bogus
(yf = bogus and max(Q(f)) ≥ T ). Allotting N inspections based on our simulated
model’s top recommendations, we determine the number of bogus firms, which were
later caught by the tax authorities, that our model would have ranked in the top N
in time T . By summing the input tax credits that these recommended bogus firms
claim in time periods greater than T, we can estimate how much lost revenue could
have potentially been saved by using our model.
For example, suppose there are 4 firms: A, B, C, D and 6 time-periods as in
figure 2.9. Firm A was inspected and identified as bogus in t=5, and firm B was
inspected and identified as bogus in t=2. At T=6 after all returns have been filed
and inspections have taken place, we know the class of all firms and so we know
that firms A & B are bogus. Our previous performance estimates use this state of
knowledge to train, predict and evaluate performance (T=6 panel).
Now when we simulate the state of knowledge at time T=3, we would have our
features for t=1,2,3. We would also know that firm B is bogus, since it was caught
and canceled after quarter t=2 and so did not file a return in quarter t=3. However,
we would not know that firm A, which would be caught and canceled after quarter
t=5, is bogus, and so it would be labeled as “probably legit”. Firms C & D would also
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be labeled as “probably legit”. We now train our model on all observations from t=1,
2, 3. We use these observations to make predictions on firms A, C, D but not on firm
B - since it was already canceled and is no longer operating so there is no point in
targeting it for inspections. Suppose that firm A is targeted for inspection based on
its features in t=1, 2, 3. We can now discern ourselves to its real class, “bogus” - in
reality only discovered at t=5, and see that we correctly identify it as bogus in T=3.
If we were to conduct inspections based on these recommendations, firm A would
not have been able to operate in periods 4 and 5, and the tax evasion it facilitated
in those periods would have been avoided and revenue loss averted (figure 2.9, T=3
panel, marked by asterisk).
This assumes no substitution, i.e. that if a firm was using the services of a bogus
firm to evade taxes and that bogus firm is caught and canceled, then the client
firm does not find another bogus firm to facilitate its tax evasion but instead pays
the required tax. We intend to rigorously test to what extent this is the case in
future work using a randomized controlled trial. To adjust our revenue implications
to substitution, we can multiply the revenue captured by a factor between 0 and 1
indicating what fraction of the evasion was not substituted.
Results of point-in-time simulations for various times T are detailed in table 2.2
and plotted in figure 2.10. Even based on only a few time periods, our simulated
model succeeds in targeting a sizable fraction of bogus firms in the first 400 inspec-
tions (0.12% of firms). Almost all bogus firms targeted by the model fall in the top
400 recommendations, with the other recommendations contributing very little. The
performance improves when time advances from T=2 to T=4 since the model has
more labels for training (labels from t in {1,2,3} vs. {1}), but then declines towards
the end of the dataset when there are not many bogus firms left to be detected. Note
that these simulations are not disjoint - many of the firms we would have caught in
T=2 are the ones we would have caught in T=4, 6 and so on. So we cannot simply
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Table 2.2: Point-in-time Simulation Performance for the 1-400 Inspection Group
Revenue Gained Revenue Gained Revenue Lost
Total Bogus Bogus Firms by Inspecting per Inspection Total Bogus from All Bogus Firms
T Firms Caught Caught/Inspection Entire Group (USD Millions) (USD 000s) Firms in the Sample (USD Millions)
2 94 0.24 19.44 48.60 416 49.40
4 155 0.39 43.19 107.97 412 108.38
6 156 0.39 25.48 63.70 437 63.84
8 157 0.39 9.38 23.46 395 26.43
10 46 0.11 1.70 4.24 114 4.52
12 10 0.02 0 0 22 0
Each row shows the impact of inspecting the top 400 firms by model score: the number of known bogus firms that would have been found, and the revenue
saved. The last two columns show the total number of bogus firms left to be caught at that time T, and the future revenue lost due to their activity.
add up the numbers of firms caught and revenue captured, but have to select one. Of
course, these are underestimates since some of the most suspicious “probably legit”
firms are in fact bogus firms that were never inspected.
The number of bogus firms caught and the revenue saved are also calculated per
inspection, showing an excellent hit rate of about 1 in 3 and extremely high returns
for the first 400 inspections. In all, the top 400 recommendations catch between 20%
and 40% of all known bogus firms operating at that time.
2.6.4.1 Revenue Implications
Point-in-time simulation also enables us to see how much additional revenue could
have been gained by correctly targeting a bogus firm. We now estimate this effect by
taking the top 400 firms that our point-in-time model would have recommended for
inspection, and collecting the potentially gained revenue due to earlier-than-actual
inspections of those of them that were later discovered to be bogus. For example if in
reality a bogus firm was caught by the tax authorities after quarter 4, but our model
would have recommended it for inspection in quarter 2, then the bogus firm would
have been caught and its evasion in quarters 3 & 4 prevented - which is the revenue
gained. We estimate revenue savings in the order of several tens of thousands US$
recovered per inspection of the 1-400 inspection group in the earlier and middle time
periods. In later periods, bogus firms were not yet identified by the tax authorities
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Figure 2.10: Point-in-time Simulations Performance
For a point in time simulation in time T (x axis), out of all the bogus firms still operating, the
chart shows the number of bogus firms that fall in each inspection group.
in our data and so mechanically the numbers are lower (see the results in table 2.2).
2.7 Future Work and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to assess if a machine learning tool can be effective
in catching bogus firms, in reducing the effort required by tax inspectors, and in
eventually increasing tax collections. By creating a model from VAT returns from
the state of Delhi, India and by analyzing the performance of the model, we provide
evidence that targeting inspections based on a ML model could be highly beneficial
even in a low compliance high evasion setting. Our results indicate that by using our
tool the tax administration can prevent fraud up to $15-45 million. Given that such
data exists in many tax jurisdictions and that anecdotal evidence suggests that such
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false paper trails are a common problem, our work should have high policy relevance
both within India and elsewhere.
The field level efficacy of the results that we have described in this paper needs
to be investigated. We need to evaluate whether our work reduces the effort required
by tax inspectors, and more importantly, does it improve revenue collections. A
rigorous way to assess the reduction in administrative effort due to our model would
be to target future inspections by comparing the recommendations of our model with
a list of recommendations prepared by a team of tax officials and then inspecting the
firms recommended by each and comparing performance. We are working with the
Delhi tax authority to implement this.
Simultaneously, we aim to improve the results of our model by working closely
with the tax authority in Delhi to conduct tax inspections on firms recommended by
our model. We intend to stratify these inspections by our model score, inspecting
firms throughout the model score distribution. Stratified inspection would provide
a representative training set. On the other hand, inspecting the most likely bogus
firms would provide more representatives from our rare class. We are not sure how
to trade off those one vs. the other, but a similar point-in-time simulation exercise
with our data where we only obtain information from our targeted inspections could
shed light on this question.
Finally, recovering the revenue loss which can be directly attributed to bogus
firms is not trivial. Often, the owners of these bogus firms can not be found at
their declared addresses. Even if caught, they themselves have not benefited from
the entire tax evasion. In fact, they have been key contributors to their trading
partners who have managed to reduce their declared tax liability by interacting with
these bogus firms. To do the actual revenue recovery, it is important to pursue the
firms which interact with the bogus firms. Moreover, it is possible that even if the
transactions that the trading partners declare with bogus firms have been canceled,
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the trading partners substitute these transactions to other yet to be identified bogus
firms. If our system is deployed and bogus firms try to adapt, we will face a scenario
of adversarial machine learning. All these are important questions which we hope to
study as part of our future work.
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CHAPTER 3
Red Tape? The Revenue Impact of the VAT Filing
Thresholds
3.1 Introduction
Value-added tax (VAT) is considered to be an effective tool to raise revenues by gov-
ernments across the globe (Keen and Smith, 2006). However, VAT systems across
the world are aﬄicted with size-dependent regulations. Such policies form an elemen-
tary part of the VAT administration across countries. Not only is there evidence that
monitoring effort is being directed on larger firms (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez,
2018; Bachas and Jensen, 2017), but also both the VAT registration thresholds as
well as the VAT reporting frequency thresholds depend on the reported firm revenue.
However, the benefit of size-dependent regulations, related to filing frequency,
to the tax authority is unclear. On the one hand, the tax authority may prefer
to receive as much information as fast as possible. The government might also be
liquidity constrained and prefer to receive VAT payments from firms at as high a
frequency as possible. On the other hand, the literature has provided theoretical
arguments that the tax authority should economize on administrative and compli-
ance costs by exempting small firms from taxation (Dharmapala et al., 2011). Such
optimizing concern might be even more important for low and middle income coun-
tries, where compliance costs are of first order concern. Compliance costs, relative to
firm size, might be greater for smaller firms - with little benefit to the tax authority
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(International Tax Dialogue, 2007, 2013).
It has been shown in many countries that firms close to the VAT registration
threshold, at the extensive margin, actively manipulate their reported revenues in
order to avoid registering for VAT (Onji, 2009; Gebresilasse and Sow, 2016; Liu
et al., 2017; Harju et al., 2016; Boonzaaier et al., 2017). Furthermore, recent work has
indicated that firms may also be responding to VAT filing thresholds, at the intensive
margin (Asatryan and Peichl, 2017). This work, however, only features evidence of
bunching at a threshold where the results are confounded by other changes in the
reporting regulation at that same threshold.
In this paper, we use an administrative dataset from the state of Delhi in India to
show that a policy which mandated different frequencies of filing based on reported
turnover resulted in bunching of firms below each of the thresholds. Using the change
in these reporting policies in the following years, we provide further evidence that
such sharp bunching indeed occurs due to the VAT reporting frequency thresholds.
Second, we calculate the VAT revenue losses due to such bunching. Third, the
subsequent withdrawal of the policy allows us to show that in a regime with size-
dependent reporting requirements, more frequent reporting does not lead to greater
levels of VAT collection. Finally, our back of the envelope social welfare calculations
indicate that there are substantial benefits of the implicit subsidy, in the form of a
lower frequency of return filing, offered to the smaller firms by the tax authority.
Our paper is the one of the first to carefully investigate how firms respond to mul-
tiple VAT filing thresholds on the intensive margin. We do this by taking advantage
of the unique setting in the state of Delhi in India. A careful analysis of the VAT
filing thresholds fills an important gap in the literature as the VAT filing thresholds
are quite ubiquitous, but their impact is not well studied.
Many countries mandate a uniform rate of VAT reporting at either a monthly
(e.g., Argentina, India [GST]), or a bi-monthly (e.g., Barbados), or a quarterly (e.g.,
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Cyprus) frequency. At the same time, there are many countries with policies that
mandate different rate of VAT return filing based on firm size. Out of a 2015 sample
of 103 countries for which we could determine with certainty, 39 countries had size-
dependent frequencies of VAT reporting and payments.1 Among these there are both
high-income (e.g., Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Spain,
UK, etc.) as well as low and middle income (e.g., Botswana, Colombia, Mauritius,
Philippines, South Africa, Swaziland) countries. If firms misreport their revenue in
order to avoid filing (and remitting) VAT returns more frequently, it is important to
understand the associated costs to the VAT collections.
Before answering this question empirically, it is important to understand what
the optimal “first-best” policy with regards to VAT filing frequencies might be. A
liquidity constrained government, which might be the case in low and middle income
countries, may prefer to receive VAT reports and the associated payments at as high
a frequency as possible. On the other hand, a high frequency of VAT reporting
and payments may imposes a significant compliance burden on firms, especially on
small ones. The trade-off is relatively clear: while the government prefers, for several
reasons, to obtain information and the VAT payments as frequently as possible, it
is amenable to subsidizing smaller firms - those, eligible for VAT - by imposing less
stringent filing requirements on them. The problem occurs when such policies lead
to firms actively avoiding filing more frequently, by either underreporting their true
revenues, or by under-producing and thus intentionally reducing their growth. Both
of those channels are problematic: The first one creates an environment which via
the choice of policies fosters a culture of evasion and avoidance, which is especially
troublesome for the low- and middle-income countries. The second, underproduction
channel, results in production inefficiencies, keeping the economy below its potential.
In the paper, we also perform a back of the envelope welfare analysis, by calculating
1Based on survey of the data from Young (2015).
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the minimum compliance costs needed at the level of each of the reporting categories
(annual, bi-annual, quarterly, and monthly) for the policy to be optimal, despite the
revenue costs incurred by the tax authority. In order for the welfare change due
to the filing threshold policy to be positive, the actual compliance costs of the more
frequent reporting need to be higher than the calculated minimum implicit subsidies.
This paper’s unique contribution is in the simultaneous analysis of the multiple
VAT filing thresholds. We observe substantial bunching of the firms below each of
these VAT filing thresholds. We are the first to estimate the resulting revenue losses
because of the bunching behavior due to the size-dependent VAT filing policy. Using
a simple analysis we further show that more frequent VAT filing does not lead to
higher revenues to the tax authority. Finally, we conduct a simple welfare analysis
to show that if the compliance costs due to the VAT filing are non-negligible, the
size-dependent filing policy can be justified due to the implicit subsidies to smaller
firms, via the reduced filing requirements.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section describes some of the
related literature. Section 3.3 describes the reforms in the VAT filing system in
Delhi and the administrative level data from Delhi that we use for our analysis, and
explains the methodology we use for the analysis. Section 3.4 presents the results
of our analysis of the firm response, of the revenue implications, and of welfare.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
We contribute to several strands of literature. We add to the literature on the effects
of size-dependent policies on firm behavior. The literature has shown that size-based
regulations can lead to distortions (Gollin, 1995; Guner et al., 2008). Garicano et al.
(2016) look at the context of labor laws in France, which are applicable on firms with
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50 or more employees. Using administrative-level firm data, they find that the cost
of such regulations is equivalent to a 2.3% tax on labor, and that such regulations
negatively impact welfare to the tune of 3.4% of GDP. They also show that such size-
dependent regulations are effectively subsidizing small firms, at a cost to workers and
to some extent large firms. In the context of taxation, Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez
(2018) show that the threshold relevant for the large tax payers unit, which monitors
large firms in Spain, results in strategic bunching of the firms in order to avoid
stricter monitoring by the tax authority. Finally, they show that extending stricter
monitoring to small businesses would generally generate substantial welfare gains.
Such size dependent policies are ubiquitous across countries. In a cross-country
study, Bachas and Jensen (2017) find that greater firm size results in increased tax
enforcement and tax compliance, with negative effects on giving bribes. Important
for our work, they show that such a size gradient in tax enforcement is the strongest
in developing countries. In the VAT context, Mittal and Mahajan (2017) show that
strengthened paper trail leads to an increase in tax collection, primarily driven by
the behavior of the largest firms.
We also add on to the wide literature discussing VAT policy design, both theoret-
ically and empirically. For instance, Keen and Smith (2006) discuss the problematic
aspects of VAT policy in the EU countries, particularly those that result in a greater
propensity for tax evasion and fraud. They also look at the possibility of a federal
VAT system in the US. Bird and Gendron (2007) discuss the application of VAT in
lower income countries, and detail many implementation challenges encountered in
such settings: inappropriate thresholds, delayed refunds, and insufficient audits.
Additionally, we contribute to the literature on calculating the hassle costs af-
filiated with filing taxes. In this realm, Benzarti (2017) estimates the cost of filing
income taxes using US income tax return data. He finds that such hassle costs are
increasing with income of households. We also add on to the literature analyzing the
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VAT registration thresholds: in those cases, firms below a certain size are exempt
from registering for the VAT system and thus from paying VAT. In their theoretical
work, Keen and Mintz (2004) look at the optimal registration threshold in the case of
VAT, and show that such a threshold will necessarily lead to production inefficiencies
via the bunching below the thresholds.
A growing literature has empirically analyzed the effect of the VAT registration
threshold. The first paper to recognize the reaction of firms to the VAT registration
threshold was Onji (2009), which documents that large firms masquerade as many
small firms in response to the VAT registration threshold in Japan. Liu et al. (2017)
consider the VAT registration notches and voluntary registration below the VAT
registration threshold in the context of the UK. Their bunching estimates, based on
separate annual observations of British firms between 2004 and 2010, are in the range
between 0.815 and 1.286. They furthermore look at the determinants of voluntary
registrations and of the bunching behavior, listing the low cost of inputs relative to
sales, high proportion of business-to-customers sales, and high product market com-
petition as determinants of higher bunching. Harju et al. (2016) look at the impact
of the VAT registration threshold on the behavior of small Finnish firms. They find
that the firms actively avoid VAT liability, and that such avoidance is directly caused
by the compliance costs of VAT. Furthermore, they find that the bunching behavior
persists over the long-term, implying that the VAT registration threshold perma-
nently hinders the growth of small firms. They find a strong bunching response to
the VAT notch, of 3.63.
In the context of a developing country, Boonzaaier et al. (2017) use tax register
data from South Africa to look at the effects of several discontinuities in the tax
schedule on the behavior of small firms. They find a moderate level of the bunching
response, of 1, at the VAT registration notch. Along similar lines as the Finnish study,
the work on South Africa finds that the bunching firms are less likely to show strong
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growth dynamics and are more like to be ’stuck’ in terms of their profits and sales.
Similarly, Gebresilasse and Sow (2016) look at the firm response to VAT registration
threshold in Ethiopia, and estimate substantial bunching, with the bunching response
equaling 4.8.
The closest paper to ours, by Asatryan and Peichl (2017), looks at the effects of
both the VAT registration threshold and the so-called administrative thresholds, on
the reported revenues by Armenian firms. Their analysis shows a moderate response
to the VAT filing frequency threshold, which - however - corresponds to some other
regulatory thresholds. For their full sample, they find the bunching response of 1.569.
Their heterogeneity analysis shows that the response is driven up by growing firms,
and by firms in the primary sector and services. Furthermore, they show, using
audited tax returns, that the response is mainly driven by evasion, rather than by
underproduction. Finally, Asatryan and Peichl (2017) find no response to the VAT
registration threshold notch.
3.3 Methodology
This section describes the methodology we use to derive the distributional and other
results discussed in the following section. We describe the methodology used to
derive the bunching estimates, and the methodology to identify the VAT revenue
losses to the tax authority due to the imposed reporting thresholds and the resulting
bunching. We then describe the methodology we use to show that there are no
apparent revenue benefits to the tax authority by the firms providing more frequent
information in the form of the VAT reports. Lastly, we outline our methodology for
the general social welfare analysis of the VAT reporting thresholds. We begin by
describing the policy variation and the data that allows us to do all of the above.
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3.3.1 Delhi: Policy Change
For the five years in Delhi, India for which we have the data, the return filing pol-
icy had rich variation. Firms had to file returns at a specific frequency depending
their on declared turnover in the previous financial year. For the first two years, Y1
and Y2, there were 3 thresholds of interest: Threshold 1 at |1 million (Indian ru-
pees; ~$15,000), threshold 2 at |5 million (~$77,000), and threshold 3 at |50 million
(~$770,000). For the third year, Y3, threshold 1 and threshold 2 were disbanded but
the threshold 3 still existed. Y4 onwards, all firms had to file returns at a uniform
quarterly frequency and there were no thresholds.
If a firm declared its turnover to be below threshold 1 (the low threshold) in the
previous year, then it had to file returns at the annual frequency in year 1 and 2. If
a firm declared its turnover to be between threshold 1 and threshold 2 (the middle
threshold), then it had to file returns once in every 6 months, twice a year. If a firm
declared its turnover to be between threshold 2 and threshold 3 (the high threshold),
then it had to file returns at a quarterly frequency. Firms with declared turnover
above threshold 3 had to file returns at a monthly frequency. Therefore, in years
1 and 2, the tax authority was receiving returns at annual, biannual, quarterly and
monthly frequency. In year 3, the tax authority was receiving returns at quarterly
and monthly frequency only. In year 4 and 5, the tax authority was receiving returns
only at the quarterly frequency. Firms who were initially filing 12 returns every year,
by virtue of declaring their turnover to be greater than |50 million the previous year,
now had to file only 4 returns every year.
This change in policy allows us to pin-down that the bunching behavior that we
observe around these thresholds is indeed happening due to the policy of interest
and is not a confounded effect of some other policy.
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3.3.2 Data
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Firms by Size in the Dataset
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Notes: The figure shows the (relatively smooth) distribution of the firms according to their revenue
in our sample, combining the samples from each of the years in our analysis (fiscal years 2010/11-
2014/15). The x-axis shows the reported firm revenue, while the y-axis shows the corresponding
frequency of the firms with the reported revenue shown on the x-axis.
We use the form 16 data described in section 1.4 and section 1.4.1 for our analysis.
Since all thresholds of interest are defined on annual levels, if a firm is filing multiple
returns in a given financial year, we aggregate the values at the financial year level.
We have 5 years of tax returns from the state of Delhi, India from the fiscal year
2010-11 until the fiscal year 2014-15.
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3.3.3 Bunching at Thresholds
Throughout our bunching analysis, we focus on the effects in the vicinity of each of
the thresholds. We divide firms into bins of |30,000 around the low (annual firm
revenue of |1 million ~ $15,000) and the middle thresholds (annual revenue of |5
million ~ $77,000). Similarly, we divide the firms into bins of |300,000 around the
high threshold (annual firm revenue of |50 million ~ $770,000).
The lower excluded area, starting at R1 to the left of a given threshold and
ending at the threshold T , features a discontinuous increase in the distributions of
firms right before the threshold. The upper excluded area, starting at the threshold
T and ending at R2 to the right of a given threshold, features a missing mass in the
number of firms immediately after the threshold. For each threshold, we visually
observe the discontinous increase in the number of firms before the threshold and
use this visual observation to find the value of R1. We use the convergence method,
as described by Kleven and Waseem (2013), to find the values of R2 for each of
the thresholds. Specifically, we choose the value of R2 such that the area above the
counterfactual distribution between R1 and T , and the area below the counterfactual
distribution between T and R2 are approximately equal.
As a proxy estimate of the counterfactual distribution, we draw a fitted fourth-
degree polynomial across all observations, excluding the lower and upper excluded
area, to the left and to the right of a given threshold. We run the following regression
to estimate the smooth polynomial:
Cj =
4∑
i=1
βi(Bj)
i + εj,∀Bj ≤ R1&Bj ≥ R2, (3.1)
where Cj denotes the count of firms in a given bin Bj, T denotes the threshold, R1
denotes the beginning of the lower excluded area range (before the threshold), and
R2 denotes the end of the upper excluded area range (after the threshold). Once we
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obtain the estimates from equation (3.1), we then use the predicted counterfactual in
the excluded range as well, and predict the counterfactual number of firms as follows:
Cˆj =
4∑
i=1
βi(Bj)
i (3.2)
We then use the estimated counterfactual to estimate the bunching in the lower
excluded area (to the left of the threshold), as follows:
b =
∑
iS(Ci − Cˆi)
Cˆlowerexcluded
, (3.3)
where S denotes the set of values i, for which the bins Bi are in the lower excluded
area, namely: S = {iN|Bi[T −R1, T ]. The bunching estimate is thus the estimate
of the excess mass in the distribution of firms before the threshold relative to the
counterfactual distribution of firms, as a share of the counterfactual distribution of
firms in the lower excluded area. In particular the latter value, Cˆlowerexcluded, is calcu-
lated as a weighted average of the counterfactual in the lower excluded area, weighted
by the distance of the actual count of firms from the counterfactual distribution, as
follows:
Cˆlowerexcluded =
∑
iS
µiCˆi, (3.4)
where µi is the weight of each bin i, constructed as follows:
µi =
Ci − Cˆi∑
iS(Ci − Cˆi)
(3.5)
We represent the counterfactual distribution of firms with a solid red line in all
of the figures showing bunching, while we show the values of R1 and R2 using the
vertical red dashed lines (refer to figure 3.2, figure 3.3, and figure 3.4).
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3.3.4 VAT Revenue Loss to the Tax Authority
To calculate the tax revenue implications of firm level bunching to avoid increased
compliance costs, we need to assume that the firms in the lower excluded area (the
excess mass of firms below the threshold), and the firms in the upper excluded area
(the missing mass above the threshold) are directly comparable in terms of their
unobservable characteristics - apart from their reported revenue and the VAT they
remit. We then determine the revenue implication of the threshold regulation as
follows. First, we calculate the difference in the average VAT remitted by firms in
the upper excluded area and the VAT remitted by firms in the lower excluded area.
We then multiply the difference in the average VAT remitted per firm with the extra
bunching density, where B =
∑
iS(Ci − Cˆi). The revenue implication, R, is thus
calculated as follows:
R = (V ATmeanabove − V ATmeanbelow ) ∗B (3.6)
3.3.5 No Benefits to More Information
One question related to the VAT reporting thresholds is why the tax authority might
be interested in getting more frequent VAT reports from firms. We test whether
the tax authority benefits from the firms providing more frequent information by
receiving higher VAT collections when the firms provide more frequent information.
We proceed as follows: First, we group all data together, so that we have a pool of
observations covering 2010-2015. We then normalize the VAT collected relative to
the size of the firm in terms of its revenues, and run the following regression for firm
i in year j:
(V AT/Revenue)i,j = α + β ·NumberReportsi,j + φj + φi + i,j, (3.7)
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where V AT/Revenue is the ratio of a firm- and year-specific VAT remitted and the
reported firm revenue, α is a constant, NumberReports is the annual number of
reports filed by the firm given its reported firm size, φi and φj are the firm and the
year fixed effects, respectively (if included in the regression specification, as shown
in table 3.2), and  are the heterogeneity robust standard errors.
We additionally test the responsiveness of the VAT collected as a share of revenue
to the annual number of submitted reports by regressing the V AT/Revenue ratio on
each of the reporting categories, while having the annual reporting as the omitted
category. The regression specification for a firm i in year j is then:
(V AT/Revenue)i,j = α +
monthly∑
c=semiannual
βc · c+ φj + φi + i,j, (3.8)
where V AT/Revenue is the ratio of a firm- and year-specific VAT remitted as
a share of the reported firm revenue, α is a constant, c can take three values:
semiannual is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm filed the VAT reports at
a semiannual level in a given year, quarterly is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm filed the VAT reports at a quarterly level in a given year, monthly is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm filed the VAT reports at a monthly level in a given
year, φi and φj are the firm and the year fixed effects, respectively (if included in
the regression specification, as shown in table 3.3, and  are the heterogeneity robust
standard errors.
Using these regression specifications, we can then estimate the relationship be-
tween the number of annually filed reports (or the given reporting categories) and
the amount of VAT remitted (relative to the firms’ reported revenue) using simple
OLS regressions.
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3.3.6 Social Welfare Analysis
We conduct a very simple back of the envelope social welfare analysis. In particular,
we recognize that the overall welfare change in our context depends on the sum of the
tax authority’s revenue losses from the threshold policy, and the easing of compliance
costs incurred by the firms in our sample due to the lower filing frequencies that these
firms are now required to abide by. Therefore, we recognize that we can calculate
the minimum implicit compliance subsidy needed to be given by the tax authority
to the firms in a given reporting category in order to at least equalize the revenue
losses stemming from the bunching behavior by the firms. If the actual compliance
costs for the filing for those firms are higher than the calculated minimum implied
subsidies, the overall welfare change stemming from the policy is likely to be positive
net of implicit compliance subsidies, despite the revenue losses to the tax authority
due to the bunching behavior.
We thus calculate the implicit subsidies at each threshold i in the following man-
ner, using the values of revenue losses, R, calculated as explained in the subsection
3.3.4:
ImplicitSubsi = Ri/nj, (3.9)
where nj is the number of firms in the reporting category j below a given threshold
i. This implies that for the low threshold, we divide the revenue losses stemming from
the threshold by the number of firms reporting and paying VAT at an annual level.
For the middle threshold, we divide the revenue losses stemming from the threshold
by the number of firms reporting and paying VAT at a bi-annual level. Likewise, for
the high threshold, we divide the revenue losses stemming from the threshold by the
number of firms reporting and paying VAT at a quarterly level.
We then evaluate whether the implicit subsidies needed to equalize the revenue
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losses are lower than the likely compliance costs incurred by firms reporting and
paying VAT at a certain level of frequency.
Figure 3.2: Firm Revenue Distribution at the Low Threshold
(a) Bunching in Year 1
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Dropping mass between 0.9 and 1.28 million. 4th Degree polynomial. 30,000 rupee bins.
(b) Bunching in Year 2
60
0
70
0
80
0
90
0
10
00
0.5 1.51.0
Revenue (in million rupees)
Bins     Fitted polynomial 
Dropping mass between 0.94 and 1.25 million. 4th Degree polynomial. 30,000 rupee bins.
(c) No Bunching in Year 3
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(d) No Bunching in Year 4
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(e) No Bunching in Year 5
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the firms around the low threshold (|1 million), for
each of the years in our data (year 1: fiscal year 2010/11 to year 5: fiscal year 2014/15). Panels A
and B show the bunching behavior by the firms for the years (year 1 and 2) with differential, size-
dependent requirements of VAT filing, while panels C, D and E document that there is no bunching
behavior, with the distribution of firms being smooth around the threshold once the differential
reporting requirement is done away with (years 3-5).
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3.4 Results
In this section we describe the results obtained using the methodologies detailed in
the previous section. We first discuss the results of estimating the excess bunching at
the relevant VAT filing thresholds. The second subsection discusses the calculation of
the VAT revenue loss to the tax authority due to the existence of the arbitrary VAT
filing thresholds. The third subsection shows that there are no apparent revenue
benefits to the tax authority of more frequent information provision by the firms.
The fourth subsection concludes by providing the relevant welfare analysis of the
size-dependent VAT filing policy.
3.4.1 Bunching at Thresholds
This section discusses the results of estimating the excess bunching at each of the
VAT filing thresholds according to the methodology described in the section 3.3.3.
The low threshold, set at the revenue of |1 million, was relevant for the size-
dependent VAT filing policy in years 1 and 2 (2010-11 and 2011-12) and mandated
the change of return filing from an annual to a bi-annual frequency. Figures 3.1a
and 3.1b show that such policy resulted in excess bunching at the threshold, with
the bunching estimates of 0.5 for year 1, and 0.28 for year 2, respectively. In years
3, 4, and 5, the policy was discontinued, and all the firms around the threshold
were required to file their VAT reports on a quarterly basis. As figures 3.1c to 3.1e
illustrate, there was - in contrast to years 1 and 2 - no excess bunching around the
low threshold in the later years.
The middle threshold, set at the revenue of |5 million, mandated the change of
return filing from a bi-annual to a quarterly frequency in years 1 and 2 (2010-11 and
2011-12). Instead of filing the VAT returns twice a year, firms with the reported
revenue above |5 million in the previous year were required to file their reports four
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Figure 3.3: Firm Revenue Distribution at the Middle Threshold
(a) Bunching in Year 1
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
4.0 4.5 5.5 6.05.0
Revenue (in million rupees)
Bins     Fitted polynomial 
Dropping mass between 4.9 and 5.15 million. 4th Degree polynomial. 30,000 rupee bins.
(b) Bunching in Year 2
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Dropping mass between 4.9 and 5.27 million. 4th Degree polynomial. 30,000 rupee bins.
(c) No Bunching in Year 3
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(d) No Bunching in Year 4
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(e) No Bunching in Year 5
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the firms around the middle threshold (|5 million), for
each of the years in our data (year 1: fiscal year 2010/11 to year 5: fiscal year 2014/15). Panels A
and B show the bunching behavior by the firms for the years (year 1 and 2) with differential, size-
dependent requirements of VAT filing, while panels C, D and E document that there is no bunching
behavior, with the distribution of firms being smooth around the threshold once the differential
reporting requirement is done away with (years 3-5).
times a year. Figures 3.2a and 3.2b show that such a size-dependent policy resulted
in a significant bunching, with bunching estimates equaling 0.34 and 0.43, for years 1
and 2, respectively. Figures 3.2c to 3.2e further show that such bunching disappears,
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with a much smoother distribution of reported firm revenues, once the threshold
policy was done away with in years 3, 4, and 5.
Figure 3.4: Firm Revenue Distribution at the High Threshold
(a) Bunching in Year 1
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Dropping mass between 47.5 and 53 million. 4th Degree polynomial. 300,000 rupee bins.
(b) Bunching in Year 2
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Dropping mass between 48 and 54 million. 4th Degree polynomial. 300,000 rupee bins.
(c) Bunching in Year 3
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Dropping mass between 47.5 and 54 million. 4th Degree polynomial. 300,000 rupee bins.
(d) No Bunching in Year 4
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(e) No Bunching in Year 5
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the firms around the high threshold (|50 million), for
each of the years in our data (year 1: fiscal year 2010/11 to year 5: fiscal year 2014/15). Panels
A-C show the bunching behavior by the firms for the years (years 1, 2, and 3) with differential, size-
dependent requirements of VAT filing, while panels D and E document that there is no bunching
behavior, with the distribution of firms being smooth around the threshold once the differential
reporting requirement is done away with (years 4 and 5).
The highest threshold, set at the revenue of |50 million, mandated the change
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of return filing from a quarterly frequency to a monthly frequency in years 1, 2,
and 3 (2010-11 to 2012-13). In these years, the firms with the reported revenue
greater than |50 million, in the previous year, had to file VAT returns twelve times
a year compared to firms just below the threshold, which had to file VAT returns
four times a year. Figures 3.3a to 3.3c again indicate substantial bunching due to
such filing threshold, with bunching estimates equaling 2.6, 2.98, and 1.87, in years
1, 2, and 3, respectively. Figures 3.3d and 3.3e show that after the threshold policy
was done away with in years 4 and 5 - with all firms now filing the VAT reports on
a quarterly basis - the distribution of reported revenues becomes much smoother,
with no bunching at the relevant threshold of |50 million. This indicates that the
observed bunching indeed occurs due to the filing policy.
Within each of the thresholds, we see that the bunching occurs at approximately
the same magnitude. For the low threshold, we see a decrease of bunching in the
second year; for the middle threshold, we see a slight increase in the second year
bunching; for the high threshold, we see an increase in bunching from year 1 to 2,
followed by a decrease in bunching in year 3. Assuming that the level of bunching is
a proxy for actual compliance costs incurred by firms, figure 3.5 uses these bunching
estimates to track the compliance costs across different revenue sizes and plots the
bunching estimates on the y-axis versus the revenue sizes for the relevant thresholds
on the x-axis. While compliance costs seem to remain more or less at the same
level across the low and middle threshold, we see a sharp increase in the apparent
compliance costs at the high threshold. This implies that compliance costs of a
differential VAT reporting policy are generally increasing with the reported revenue.
3.4.2 VAT Revenue Loss to the Tax Authority
This section discusses the calculation of the VAT revenue loss to the tax authority
due to the differential, size-dependent filing policy according to the methodology
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Compliance Costs by Revenue Size
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Notes: The figure shows the bunching estimates (on the y-axis) against the reported revenue at
each of the thresholds, for which the bunching is estimated. The figure provides an indication of
increasing compliance costs with the size of the reported revenue thresholds.
described in the section 3.3.4.
We compare the VAT contributions of firms in the bunching region below and the
region above the threshold. Table 3.1 shows that the revenue losses are substantial.
For the low threshold, the losses amount to nearly |900,000 in year 1, and to nearly
|500,000 in year 2. These amounts are, respectively, 2.3% and 1.8% of the bunchers’
(all firms just below the threshold) total VAT contributions, therefore presenting a
substantial loss of VAT revenues to the tax authority. For the middle threshold,
the losses are generally less substantial, amounting to above |700,000 in year 1, and
above |100,000 in year 2. These amounts respectively equal 1.8% and 0.03% of
the bunchers’ total VAT contributions in the respective years. The losses are most
substantial for the high threshold, amounting to nearly |40,000,000 in year 1, and
above |20,000,000 in years 2 and 3. These amounts are also the highest as a share of
92
Table 3.1: VAT Revenue Lost
Threshold level
Low Middle High
Year (|1 million) (|5 million) (|50 million)
2010-11 886,017 730,557 38,373,960
(2.3%) (1.8%) (8.3%)
2011-12 441,600 128,150 21,862,749
(1.8%) (0.03%) (5.2%)
2013-14 22,871,560
(4.2%)
Notes: Values in Indian rupees. The amounts ex-
pressed as a percentage of the bunchers’ (i.e. that of
firms in the lower excluded area) VAT contributions
are in the brackets. The values are calculated as de-
scribed in the section 3.3.4.
the bunchers’ total VAT contributions, amounting to 8.3%, 5.2%, and 4.2% in years
1, 2, and 3, respectively. These estimates confirm the findings in section 3.4.1 that
the bunching is not only the highest, but also the costliest for the high threshold.
3.4.3 No Benefits to More Information
This section discusses the regressions looking at the relationship between the
VAT/revenue ratio and the frequency of VAT reporting, as discussed in the method-
ology section 3.3.5. Table 3.2 shows the regression results looking at the relationship
between the VAT/revenue ratios and the yearly number of VAT reports.
Columns 1 and 2 show that the relationship is strikingly negative without includ-
ing firm fixed effects in the regression specification, implying that the greater the
number of VAT reports per year, the smaller the VAT/revenue ratio. When includ-
ing firm fixed effects in the regression specification, as shown by columns 3 and 4,
the relationship turns positive but strongly insignificant.
Table 3.3 similarly shows the regression results looking at the relationship between
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Table 3.2: VAT Revenue vs. Annual Number of VAT Returns Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES VAT/Revenue VAT/Revenue VAT/Revenue VAT/Revenue
NumberReports -0.000148*** -0.000314*** 0.000474 0.000247
(3.18e-05) (0.000100) (0.000468) (0.000278)
Firm FE NO NO YES YES
Time FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 1,038,331 1,038,331 1,038,331 1,038,331
No. of firms 301,147 301,147 301,147 301,147
R2 0.000 0.000 0.703 0.703
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses. The regression table
presents the results of regressions performed according to the methodology described in the sec-
tion 3.3.5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
the VAT/revenue ratios and different reporting categories, with annual reporting
being the omitted category. As columns 1 and 2 show, when not including firm fixed
effects, all reporting categories are negatively related to the VAT/revenue ratios
compared to those firm-year observations with annual reporting. Once including
firm fixed effects in the regression, the estimates turn positive, but again remain
strongly insignificant.
Our interpretation of the results of both of the sets of regressions is that greater
than annual frequency of VAT reporting does not lead to more VAT being collected,
as measured by the VAT/revenue ratios.
3.4.4 Social Welfare Analysis
In this section we discuss the results of the back of the envelope social welfare anal-
ysis that we conducted according to the methodology outlined in section 3.3.6. In
table 3.4 we present the calculated implicit subsidies. The implicit subsidies needed
to equalize welfare are very low. At the low threshold for year 1 - an implicit welfare
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Table 3.3: VAT Revenue vs. VAT Filing Categories Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES VAT/Revenue VAT/Revenue VAT/Revenue VAT/Revenue
SemiAnnualCategory -0.00685*** -0.00685*** 0.00521 0.00516
(0.000206) (0.000206) (0.00782) (0.00778)
QuarterlyCategory -0.00312* -0.00677*** 0.00696 0.00606
(0.00162) (0.000313) (0.00823) (0.00819)
MonthlyCategory -0.00541*** -0.00713*** 0.00670 0.00546
(0.000286) (0.000999) (0.00819) (0.00717)
Firm FE NO NO YES YES
Time FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 1,038,331 1,038,331 1,038,331 1,038,331
No. of firms 301,147 301,147 301,147 301,147
R2 0.000 0.000 0.703 0.703
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses. Annual reporting is the omitted
category. The regression table presents the results of regressions performed according to the methodology
described in the section 3.3.5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
equalizing per firm subsidy of |40.77 (less than $1) implies that the welfare change
of reducing the frequency would be negative only in the case that compliance costs
borne by a given firm reporting and paying VAT at an annual level would be less
than $1, which is extremely unlikely. The implicit welfare equalizing per firm sub-
sidy for year 2, at the low threshold is even smaller. Similarly, the welfare equalizing
subsidies for the middle threshold are comparably low.
The implicit welfare equalizing subsidies for the high threshold are an order of
magnitude higher, ranging from |1327.97 (about $25) in year 3 to |2990.02 (about
$60) in year 1. The implication of these implicit welfare equalizing per firm subsidies
is, however, similar as for the low and the middle thresholds. The actual compliance
- that is, filing and paying - costs difference (quarterly level of reporting relative
to monthly reporting) associated with VAT of these firms, reporting at a quarterly
level is certainly higher than $60. That means that the tax authority subsidizes these
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Table 3.4: Implicit Welfare Equalizing Per Firm Subsidies from the Thresholds
Threshold level
Low threshold Middle threshold High threshold
Year ( |1 million) ( |5 million) ( |50 million)
2010-11 40.77 14.54 2990.02
2011-12 17.31 2.55 1505.49
2013-14 1327.97
Notes: Values in Indian rupees. The implicit minimum welfare equalizing
per firm subsidies are computed according to the methodology in the sec-
tion 3.3.6
firms by reducing the frequency at which they have to file, and yet increases the social
welfare. Put another way, this analysis leads us to conclude that even though the tax
authority incurs significant losses due to thresholds, its implicit subsidies to small
and medium-sized firms are large enough to overcome the revenue losses.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we identify bunching behavior by firms at the VAT filing thresholds,
using an administrative-level dataset from the state of Delhi in India. Our unique
dataset along with rich policy variation also enables us to show that the bunching
completely disappears when the thresholds are done away with. The bunching is the
greatest at the highest threshold indicating that compliance is most costly for those
firms. We further show that the VAT revenue losses due to the bunching response by
firms are substantial, up to 8.3% of the bunchers’ total VAT contributions in certain
years. We also suggest that there may be no benefits to the tax authority from
receiving more frequent information through the VAT filing reports. Finally, our
social welfare analysis shows that given that the costs of compliance by the firms are
likely relatively large, the net-of-implicit-subsidies welfare impact of the thresholds
is positive despite the substantial revenue losses to the tax authority.
We note two potential channels through which the firms may bunch: underpro-
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duction and underreporting. The first channel, underproduction, would imply that
the bunching firms halt their production or sales as soon as they start getting close
to the threshold. This channel potentially brings about large welfare losses, not only
because of the current reduction in the firm-level profits, but also due to the shift
in the long-run growth path of the bunching firms. In the case of such channel be-
ing the dominant one, the welfare losses due to the policy (while not considering
the implicit subsidies due to the reduced filing frequencies for smaller firms) would
be the highest, with real and longer-term consequences in the form of stalled firm
growth. The second potential bunching channel encompasses the intentional revenue
underreporting by the firms. If such underreporting occurs and is substantial, the
welfare losses would occur via the lost tax revenues. One potential sub-channel in
the firm revenue underreporting is revenue shifting: in such a case, a portion of
the bunching firms illegitimately register a part of their sales for the following filing
period in order to avoid passing the relevant reporting threshold. In such a case,
the welfare consequences of the policy would be the smallest of the three bunching
channel options; the firms would only misreport the current revenues to avoid more
frequent filing, but would not affect their actual long term real growth, and would
eventually report all of their revenues. In future work, we intend to make progress
on identifying which of the potential channels are in play.
All in all, our analysis shows that firms’ compliance costs to the VAT policy are
quite large, with unclear benefits of more frequent information and payments being
made by the VAT registered firms. Tax authorities should thus aim to reduce the
compliance costs, which apparently play a substantial role in the firms’ behavior.
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APPENDIX A
“VAT in Emerging Economies: Does Third Party
Verification Matter?”
A.1 Data Summary
Figure A.1: Total VAT Remitted (For All Firms)
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The third party verification policy began at the beginning of year 3. VAT remitted increases from |106.33 billion in
year 1 to |116.29 billion in year 5. This is an average annual growth rate of 1.8% in real terms as compared to a real
state level GDP growth rate of about 5.7% (Source:(Directorate of Economics and Statistics, GNCTD, 2015)). The
y axis is in billion rupees, where 1$ roughly equals |65.Values have been adjusted to year 1 price terms.
In this section, we describe the distribution of the firms registered in the Delhi
VAT system. In figure A.1, we plot the total VAT collections and the total number
of firms registered for VAT across the 5 years. The third-party verification policy
was implemented at the beginning of year 3. VAT deposits increase from |106.33
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Figure A.2: Total VAT Remitted (For Firms That are Present in All Years)
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Total collection trends for firms that are present in all the years of our sample period. There are 148434 such firms.
The y axis is in billion rupees, where 1$ roughly equals |65. Values have been adjusted to year 1 price terms. VAT
remitted increases from |102.02 billion in year 1 to |104.07 billion in year 5.
billion in year 1 to |116.29 billion in year 5. This is an average annual growth rate of
1.8% in real terms as compared to a real state level GDP growth rate of about 5.7%.
We note that the number of registered firms go up sharply after the policy change
which implies that average collections per firm actually decrease. We believe that this
increase in the number of firms is driven by unrelated policy changes. Specifically,
before quarter 2 of year three, firms had to deposit a surety amount between |50,000
to |100,000 as part of registration. The tax authority relaxed this restriction with
the goal of improving “ease of doing business” from the second quarter of year three
onwards.
The number of firms filing a return increases from 192,664 in year 1 to 271,090
in year 5. There is a wide variation in the amount deposited. To begin with, only
about 50% of registered firms remit a positive VAT in any given filing period. Further,
between 7 and 15% of the firms (depending upon the tax period) that file a return
report a zero turnover (sales). Furthermore, between 5 and 9% of the firms declare
their entire turnover to consist of interstate (or non-local) sales and about 32% firms
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Figure A.3: Lorenz Curve for All Firms in Tax Year 1
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Lorenz Curve (Year 1)
Note: Only 50% of firms deposit any taxes, and 5% of firms provide 95% of total collections. Lorenz
curve for all the firms in year 1 of our dataset (returns collated at annual level).
Table A.1: Summary Stats: All Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year No. of Firms VAT Remitted % Positive VAT % Zero-Turnover % Interstate % Local Firms
Deposited Firms Firms Firms
1 192664 106330.3 50.88 7.10 9.03 31.26
2 205832 112720.1 48.72 9.51 7.72 31.40
3 250805 115330.6 47.57 15.05 5.94 31.68
4 262775 116132.1 49.70 13.68 5.70 32.70
5 271090 116292.4 53.60 13.98 6.00 32.64
Summary of all the firms that filed a return in the given year. Column (3) shows total VAT collected by the tax authority from
all firms in that year in million rupees, with |65 approximately equal to $1. Column (4) shows percentage of firms that deposited
a positive amount of VAT. Column (5) show percentage of firms which filed a return but declared a turnover of zero. Column (6)
shows percentage of firms that had a non-zero turnover and entire sales were interstate. Column (7) shows percentage of firms who
had a non-zero turnover and all sales were local. For example, in year 1, 31.26% firms had only local sales, 9.03% had only interstate
sales, and 7.1% had a turnover of 0. Therefore, roughly 53% of the firms had a non-zero turnover and had declared both local as
well as inter-state sales.
declare their entire turnover to be purely local (refer to Table A.1). Note that
the third party verification mechanism breaks down for inter-state sales since the
transacting firm’s returns are submitted to a different tax authority and to date
there has been little coordination between different tax jurisdictions on such cross-
checking.1
1The GST bill legislated by the central and state governments will unify the tax administration
and make it much easier to cross-check inter-state transactions.
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Figure A.4: Lorenz Curve for All Firms in Tax Year 5
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In figures A.3 and A.4 we plot Lorenz curves for (a) total turnover, (b) VAT
remitted, and (c) a dummy for any positive VAT remitted separately for year 1 and
5 of the study. Inequality in contributions is stark with the top 5% of firms remitting
roughly 95% of the total VAT collected by the tax authority. The number of firms
that remit any VAT is surprisingly low, with the number hovering around 50% across
the 5 years.
In figure A.2 we focus our attention on firms which are present in all 5 years of
our dataset i.e. we drop firms that enter or exit during our time-frame of interest.
There are 148,434 such firms which remit roughly 95% of our total tax collections
in year 1 and 89% of the tax collections in year 5. VAT remits from these firms go
from |102.02 billion in year 1 to |104.07 billion in year 5 (for a real growth rate of
0.39%). In this set of firms, the percentage of firms remitting a positive amount goes
up marginally, compared to all firms, to about 57%. The percentage of firms that
declare a turnover of zero is between 2.5 to 8.5% across the 5 years. The percentage
of firms doing only interstate sales and only local sales is also comparable to the
entire sample (refer to table A.2). To conclude, our estimation sample comprises the
bulk of the tax collections for the state throughout the study period.
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Table A.2: Summary stats: Always Present Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year VATDeposited % Positive VAT % Zero-Turnover % Interstate % Local Firms
Deposited Firms Firms Firms
1 102024.5 54.60 2.50 6.97 30.76
2 107820.3 54.09 3.09 5.95 31.14
3 108985.1 57.20 3.88 5.34 30.61
4 106926.4 57.50 5.35 5.18 30.45
5 104071.8 60.49 8.50 5.22 29.74
Summary of firms that filed a return in all the 5 years for which we have the data (2010-11 to
2014-15). Number of such firms in our sample is 148434. Column (2) shows total VAT remitted
by the tax authority from all firms in that year in million rupees, with |65 approximately equal
to $1. Column (3) shows percentage of firms that remitted a positive amount of VAT. Column
(4) show percentage of firms which filed a return but declared a turnover of zero. Column (5)
shows percentage of firms that had a non-zero turnover and entire sales were interstate. Column
(6) shows percentage of firms who had a non-zero turnover and all sales were local. For example,
in year 1, 30.76% of the 148434 firms that are present in all the years of our sample, had only
local sales, 6.97% had only interstate sales, and 2.5% had a turnover of 0. Therefore, roughly
60% of the firms had a non-zero turnover and had declared both local as well as inter-state sales.
A.2 Quarterly Results
A.2.1 Quarterly Analysis Along with Falsification Test
In addition to the basic model explained in section 1.5.2, we carry out robustness
check by the falsification test described below. In equation (1.1), we now add a
Preit dummy which is equal to 1 if the quarter is 7 or 8 i.e. just before the in-
troduction of the third party verification policy. We also interact the Preit dummy
with I{Wholesaleri} which is a dummy for the firm i being a wholesaler. The fal-
sification test is provided by coefficient µ corresponding to the interaction between
Preit dummy and I{Wholesaleri} dummy. The coefficient indicates whether, before
the introduction of the policy, the outcome variable is evolving similarly between
wholesalers and retailers during the 2 quarters before the introduction of the policy.
Consistent with the quarterly event-study analysis (figure A.7), the pre-policy effect
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Figure A.5: Wholesalers vs Retailers: Quarterly Trends
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NW = 11482, NR = 15337. VAT remitted is in million rupees, with |65 approximately equal to
$1. VAT remitted has been inflation adjusted to Q1-2010-11 price levels. Sample smaller than the
annual frequency sample because in year 1 and year 2 firms with turnover less than 5 million had
to file at annual or semi-annual frequency.
on wholesalers is close to zero, precisely estimated,2 and statistically insignificant.
Results shown in table A.3.
yit = αi + νt + β ∗ Postit + δ ∗ Preit + γ ∗ Postit ∗ I{Wholesaleri}
+ µ ∗ Preit ∗ I{Wholesaleri}+ it (A.1)
2The standard errors are smaller than those for γ coefficient.
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Table A.3: Falsification Test: Wholesalers and Retailers (Quarterly)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Positive VAT VAT Remitted Tax Credit Output Tax Output Tax -
Remitted Tax Credit
Post*Wholesaler -0.0147*** 0.158*** -0.0240 0.132*** 0.156***
(0.00355) (0.0491) (0.0496) (0.0392) (0.0501)
PrePolicy*Wholesaler -0.00278 -0.0312 0.0385 0.00530 -0.0332
(0.00372) (0.0304) (0.0308) (0.0269) (0.0320)
Post 0.0139*** -0.0604* 0.0382* -0.0194 -0.0576**
(0.00349) (0.0322) (0.0220) (0.0392) (0.0289)
PrePolicy 0.0189*** 0.0288 0.0637*** 0.0928*** 0.0291
(0.00352) (0.0210) (0.0240) (0.0359) (0.0201)
Mean Dep.Var. 0.44 0.52 0.54 1.02 .48
(0.00) (0.09) (0.15) (0.22) (0.09)
Observations 536,380 536,380 536,380 536,380 536,380
R-squared 0.549 0.86 0.78 0.96 0.86
Number of Firms 26,819 26,819 26,819 26,819 26,819
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level. NW = 11482, NR = 15337. Monetary
amounts are in million rupees, inflation adjusted to price levels of Q1 of 2010-11, with |65 approxi-
mately equal to $1. Column (1) shows linear probability regression of the probability of remitting a
positive amount. Column (2)-(4) respectively show regression of the mean VAT remitted by firms, of
the input tax credit claimed by firms, and the output tax collected by firms. To address the concern
that VAT remitted has a significant mass at zero, column(5) shows regression of the difference between
output tax and input credit declared by firms. Dependent variables have been price adjusted in Q1 of
2010-11 terms. Row “Mean Dep.Var.” shows mean and standard errors for wholesalers in quarter 1.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A.3 Flexible DID Specifications
A.3.1 Econometric Model of Event Study Analysis
We can take advantage of the large N and moderate T dimensions in our data set to
estimate richer treatment effect models. In particular, we can examine flexibly the
differential evolution of outcomes between wholesalers and retailers over the entire
time-period under study. In particular, we estimate equation (1.2) as outlined in
section 1.5.2. We normalize γ2 in that equation (γ8 for quarterly analysis) to zero so
that the coefficients {γs}s∈S measure differential changes in the outcome and relative
to the year (quarter) prior to the policy introduction.
We report the coefficients in graphical form, with their corresponding 95% con-
fidence intervals (see for example figure A.6). If the coefficients {γs}s>2 (i.e., the
coefficients after the introduction of the third party verification) are positive, that
implies that outcomes increase on average for wholesalers relative to retailers after
the policy introduction. If γs is positive only for some 2 < s ≤ s¯ ≤ 5, then the
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Table A.4: Pre-trend Analysis: Wholesalers vs Retailers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Annual Quarter Top Decile Top Decile
(Annual) (Quarter)
Positive VAT Deposited 0.68 0.27 0.02 0.00
VAT Deposited 0.61 0.20 0.46 0.27
Tax Credit 0.12 0.36 0.69 0.43
Output Tax 0.23 0.65 0.98 0.28
Output Tax - Tax Credit 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.69
To formally test the hypothesis that pre-policy trends between wholesalers
and retailers are not different, we test the null hypothesis γ1 = γ2 = .. =
γl−1 = 0 where l denotes the time period in which the automatic third party
verification policy was introduced. l is 3 in column (1) and (3), and 9 in
column (2) and (4). Column (1) does the test for returns data at annual
frequency, column (2) does the test for returns at quarterly frequency, and
column (3) and (4) do the test for returns data at annual and quarterly fre-
quency but only for firms in the top decile (of both retailers and wholesalers)
of VAT remitted in year/quarter 1.
increase in outcomes is transitory, lasting up to s¯ years after the policy introduction.
If the coefficient γ1 (i.e., the coefficient in the figure to the left of the policy intro-
duction) is positive, then the outcome variable was declining before the introduction
of the policy.
To formally test the hypothesis that pre-policy trends between wholesalers and
retailers are not different, we test the null hypothesis γ1 = γ2 = .. = γl−1 = 0
where l denotes the time period in which the automatic third party verification
policy was introduced. For the analyses below (carried out for the quarterly and
annual frequencies) we cannot reject that pre-treatment trends are equal between
wholesalers and retailers.
105
A.3.2 Annual Analysis
Figure A.6: Event Study: Wholesalers vs Retailers (Annual)
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Notes: Graphical event-study analysis of the effect of third party verification policy on wholesalers
compared to retailers. Confidence intervals were constructed with heteroskedasticity-robust stan-
dard errors, clustered at the firm level. The coefficient for the year “-1” (i.e., the year prior the
policy) was normalized to zero. The regressions include firm fixed effects and time effects. The x
axis indicates time, with annual observations and zero indicates the first year of the third party
verification policy. Confidence intervals at the 95% level. NW = 32979, NR = 19515. Coefficients
in panel (a), (b), (c) and (d) are in million rupees with dependent variables price adjusted to the
first year levels. |65 approximately equal to $1. Pretrends are not statistically significant.
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A.3.3 Quarterly Analysis
Figure A.7: Event Study: Wholesalers vs Retailers (Quarterly)
(a) VAT Deposited
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Notes: Graphical event-study analysis of the effect of third party verification policy on wholesalers
compared to retailers. Confidence intervals were constructed with heteroskedasticity-robust stan-
dard errors, clustered at the firm level. The coefficient for the quarter “-1” (i.e., the quarter prior to
the policy) was normalized to zero. The regressions include firm fixed effects and time effects. The
x axis indicates time, with quarterly observations and zero indicates the first quarter of the third
party verification policy. Confidence intervals at the 95% level. NW = 11482, NR = 15337. Coef-
ficients in panel (a), (b), (c) and (d) are in million rupees with dependent variables price adjusted
to the first quarter of 2010 levels. |65 approximately equal to $1. Pretrends are not statistically
significant.
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A.4 Other Results
Figure A.8: Heterogeneity Analysis: Wholesalers vs Retailers
(a) Output Tax - Input Credit
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Notes: This figure plots the difference between wholesalers and retailers for different deciles, based
on VAT remitted in the first year. The x axis indicates the decile. Confidence intervals at the 95%
level. Number of retailers is 32979 and number of wholesalers is 19515. Coefficients in panel (a),
(b), and (c) are in million rupees, price adjusted to 2010-11 levels, with |65 approximately equal
to $1. Pretrends are not statistically significant.
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Figure A.9: Quarterly Analysis for Top Decile: Wholesalers vs Retailers
(a) Output Tax - Input Credit
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(d) Positive VAT Deposited
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Notes: Graphical event-study analysis of the effect of third party verification policy on whole-
salers compared to retailers (for the top decile). Confidence intervals were constructed with
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The coefficient for the group
“-1” (i.e., the year prior the policy) was normalized to zero. The regressions include firm fixed effects
and time effects. The x axis indicates time, with quarterly observations and zero indicates the first
year of the third party verification policy. We have 20 quarters of data from 2010-11 to 2014-15.
Confidence intervals at the 95% level. Number of retailers is 1533 and number of wholesalers is
1148. Coefficients in panel (a), (b), (c) and (d) are in million rupees, price adjusted to Q1 of 2010-11
levels, with |65 approximately equal to $1. Pretrends are not statistically significant.
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A.5 Policy Execution: Other
A.5.1 DiDiD: Proportion Registered Sales
Figure A.10: DiDiD: Wholesalers vs Retailers
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(b) Output Tax - Input Credit
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(c) Output Tax
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(d) Input Credit
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Notes: This figure plots the difference between wholesalers and retailers explained in equation (1.3).
The x axis indicates time, with quarterly observations and zero indicates the first quarter of the
third party verification policy. Confidence intervals at the 95% level. Number of retailers is 15337
and number of wholesalers is 11482. Coefficients in panel (a), (b), (c) and (d) are in million rupees,
price adjusted to Q1 of 2010-11 levels. Pretrends are not statistically significant.
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A.5.2 Revisions
Figure A.11: Mean Revisions of All Firms
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Total Revisions Mean
Firms are allowed to revise filed returns until the end of next financial year.
Before the start of the monitoring policy the average revision rates were around 13%
i.e. the mean of the total number of times a firm filed its returns was 1.13 (in Y1
and Y2). This revision rate was constant in the pre-period for both retailers and
wholesalers. However, immediately after the introduction of the policy, the revision
rates shot up to 30% i.e. the mean of the total number of returns filed by a firm was
now 1.3 (in Y3). As the issue mentioned between the consolidated and transaction
returns was fixed in Y4, this number further shot up temporarily in Y4 (Q13) up
to 78% in Q14 and subsequently started coming down but remained higher than
the average amount in Y1 and Y2. This happened as now the firms had to file
transaction level as well as the consolidated information (refer to figure A.11). This
behavior points towards two scenarios. Either the cost of complying with the tax
policy is going up, or the firms are colluding and the increase in revisions is due to
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Figure A.12: Mean Revisions of Wholesalers and Retailers
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Revisions (mean) by Percentile
Describing revision trends by percentile. Comparing the firms in the top percentile with the firms
in the 90th percentile
coordination costs. Either ways, it is important to think through the efficacy of the
third party verification policy. Specifically, if most of the gain in revenue is from the
top percentile of firms, then increasing the cost of compliance for firms across the
board may not be cost efficient, both for the firms as well as the tax authority.
There seems to be size based variation in the revision trends as well. When
we compare wholesalers and retailers, we see that the 99th percentile (in terms of
VAT deposited) of both the wholesalers and retailers revise their returns at a greater
frequency than the 90th percentile firms (refer to figure A.12). This again hints
towards the increase in revisions being driven by the increased cost of compliance.
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A.5.3 Matching
Figure A.13: Matching on the Purchase Side for All Firms
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In figure A.13, figure A.14, figure A.15, and figure A.16 we show the accuracy with
which the sale and purchase transactions of firms match. Our ex-ante expectation
was that after the policy was mandated, the transaction records will perfectly align.
However, this does not seem to be the case. Figure A.13 shows the average matches
of the purchase declarations of a firm with the corresponding sale declarations of the
selling firm. If we match only at the firm-id level, without considering the amount
and tax rate declared, the most generous specification possible, the matching started
around 90% in the first year (Y3 of our dataset) and is around 96% in year 5 of our
analysis. 4% of transactions are still unaccounted for ex-post.
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Figure A.14: Matching on the Sales Side for All Firms
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We further narrow our analysis and consider the differences in amount. We try
two specifications and the results are similar in both the specifications. We classify
a transaction as a match if the difference in the total purchases declared by a firm
(A) and the total sales declared by the corresponding firm (B) is less than 5 rupees
or 1% of the total purchases made by the firm A from firm B. One can assume that
the mismatches that happen within this classification, are mostly driven by human
error as the revenue implication is minimal. With this specification, the matching
rate goes down to roughly 90% across all the quarters. Therefore, roughly 10% of the
purchase declarations do not match in our sample in a serious manner. Figure A.14
repeats the analysis but now we are comparing the sales transactions declared by a
firm with the corresponding purchase transactions of the buying firms. The results
are similar except that now the firm-id level matching has gone down to 80% across
quarters.
In figure A.15 and figure A.16 , we repeat the purchase and sale matching analysis
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Figure A.15: Matching Analysis: Retailers Vs Wholesalers (Purchases, Top Per-
centile)
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Mean of purchases matching with sales
Describing revision trends by percentile. Comparing the firms in the top percentile with the firms
in the 90th percentile
but limiting ourselves only to our difference-in-difference sample of wholesalers and
retailers. An interesting insight that is clearly visible is that matching for 90th
percentile firms for both wholesalers as well as retailers is higher than the matching
for the 99th percentile for the corresponding group. This is unexpected and further
highlights that just the third party verification information may not be sufficient to
reduce evasion and increase tax collections. Some sort of human monitoring effort
on top of it is also needed, as despite this lower matching, most of the tax deposit
growth is coming from the top percentile of wholesalers.
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Figure A.16: Matching Analysis: Retailers Vs Wholesalers (Sales, Top Percentile)
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Describing revision trends by percentile. Comparing the firms in the top percentile with the firms
in the 90th percentile
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A.5.4 Consolidated vs Transaction Data
Figure A.17: Consolidated vs Transactional Data
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Tax Credits: Consolidated vs Transaction Data
In the first year, transaction data was not matched with the consolidated returns. Firms were
clearly fudging, which was fixed in the subsequent years. We drop Q12 as unexplained behavior
(possibly unrelated) is skewing the image.
In the first year of the third party verification policy, transaction records filed were
independently from the consolidated returns and these were not required to be con-
sistent to each other. Therefore, it was possible that the aggregated transaction
records did not match the consolidated returns – which is what we observe. Specifi-
cally, total input credit claimed in the consolidated forms is on average higher than
that implied by the annexures. The tax authority began requiring mechanical rec-
onciliation of the two forms in the subsequent year at which point such divergence
ceases by definition – see figure A.17).
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APPENDIX B
“Return Forms”
B.1 Consolidated Form
Figure B.1: Page 1 - Form 16
Page 1 of 10 
Ward No. ____ 
         
 
R1 Tax 
Period 
From / / T
o 
/ / 
Dd mm yy dd mm yy 
R2.1 TIN 
R2.2  Full Name of 
Dealer 
R2.3  Address of Principal 
Place of Business  
R2.4  Mobile No. 
R3  Description of top  items you deal  
in  
(In order of volume of sales for the tax 
period or till the aggregate of sale 
volume reaches at least 80% -  1-
highest volume to 5-lowest volume) 
Sl. 
No.  
Commodity 
Code  
Description of 
Goods  
Tax 
Rate 
Tax 
contribution 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
R4  Turnover details 
R4.1 Gross Turnover 
R4.2 Central Turnover 
R4.3 Local Turnover 
R5 Computation of output tax Turnover (Rs.) Output tax (Rs.) 
R5.1 Goods taxable at 1% 
R5.2 Goods taxable at 5% 
R5.3 Goods taxable at 12.5% 
R5.4 Goods taxable at 20% 
R5.5Works contract taxable at 5% 
R5.6 Works contract taxable at 12.5% 
R5.7 Exempted Sales (Tax Free) 
R5.8  Charges towards labour, services and 
other like charges 
R5.9 Charges towards cost of land, if any, in civil 
works contracts 
R5.10 Sale of Diesel & Petrol as have suffered 
tax  in the hands of various Oil Marketing 
Companies in Delhi. 
R5.11 Sales within Delhi against Form ‘H’ 
R5.12   Output Tax before adjustments  Sub Total 
R5.13 Adjustments to output tax (Complete  Annexure and enter  Total A2 here) 
R5.14 Total Output Tax 
 (R5.12 + R5.13) 
R6 Turnover of Purchases in Delhi (excluding 
tax)    &   tax credits 
Purchases (Rs.) Tax Credits (Rs.) 
R6.1   Capital goods 
R6.2   Other goods  
R6.2(1) Goods taxable at 1% 
R6.2(2)Goods taxable at 5% 
R6.2(3) Goods taxable at 12.5% 
R6.2(4) Goods taxable at 20% 
R6.2(5) Works contract taxable at 5% 
R6.2(6) Works contract taxable at 12.5% 
Refund Claimed? 
 Yes
 No
Department of Trade & Taxes 
Government of NCT of Delhi 
Form DVAT 16 
[See Rule 28 and 29] 
Delhi Value Added Tax Return 
Original/Revised 
If revised – 
(i) Date of filing 
original return ______
(ii) Acknowledgement
Receipt No. _________
(iii) Date of discovery of
mistake or error ________
Specify the reasons for revision 
Total A2 
from 
Annexure 
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Figure B.2: Page 2 - Form 16
Page 2 of 10 
 
R6.3 Local purchases not eligible for credit 
of Input Tax 
                      
R6.3(1) Purchase from Unregistered dealers                       
R6.3(2) Purchases from Composition dealers                       
R6.3(3) Purchase of Non creditable goods 
(Schedule-VII) 
                      
R6.3(4) Purchase of Tax Free Goods 
(Exempted) 
                      
R6.3(5) Purchases of labour and services 
related to works contract 
                      
R6.3(6) Purchases against tax invoices not 
eligible for ITC 
                      
R6.3(7) Purchase of goods against retail 
invoices 
                      
R6.3(8) Purchase of Diesel & Petrol taxable in 
the hands of various Oil Marketing Companies in 
Delhi 
                      
R6.3(9) Purchases from Delhi dealers  against 
Form ‘H’ 
                      
R6.3(10) Purchase of Capital Goods (Used for 
manufacturing of non-creditable goods) 
                      
R6.4    Tax credit before adjustments                     Sub Total               
R6.5  Adjustments to tax credits (Complete Annexure and enter Total A4 here)                              
R6.6  Total Tax Credits  (R6.4 + R6.5))           
 
R7.1   Net Tax                                                                              (R5.14) – (R6.6)         
R7.2    Interest   @   15%    if payable                                        (B)           
R7.3   Penalty, if payable                (C)           
R7.4  Tax deducted at source      (attach TDS certificates (downloaded from 
website) with Form DVAT 56)   
          
Sl. 
No. 
Form DVAT-43 ID 
No. 
Date Amount  
    
 
R7.5  Tax credit carried forward from previous tax period           
R7.6  Adjustment of excess balance under CST towards DVAT liability            
R7.7  Balance payable  [(R7.1+R7.2+R7.3) – (R7.4+R7.5 +R7.6)]                        
R7.8 Amount deposited by the dealer   (attach proof of payment with Form DVAT-
56)   
          
S.No.  Date of deposit Challan 
No. 
Name of Bank and Branch Amount (Rs.) 
 
 
 
   
R8   Net Balance*                                  (R7.7-R7.8)           
* The net balance should not be positive as the amount due has to be deposited before filing the return. 
 
                         IF THE NET BALANCE ON LINE R8 IS NEGATIVE, PROVIDE DETAILS IN THIS BOX 
R9  Balance brought forward from line R8     (Positive value of R 8)                                                                                    
R9.1  Adjusted against liability under Central Sales Tax           
R9.2  Refund Claimed           
R9.3  Balance carried forward to next tax period           
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            IF REFUND IS CLAIMED, PROVIDE DETAILS  IN  THIS  BOX  (Also fill Annexure-2E) 
R10 Details of Bank Account  
R10.1 Account No.                         
R10.2 Account type (Saving/Current etc.)                         
R10.3 MICR No.                         
R10.4 
(a) Name of Bank 
(b) Branch Name 
                        
                        
                        
 
 
R11 Inter-state trade and exports/ imports Inter-state Sales/Exports Inter-state Purchases / 
Imports 
R11.1 Against C Forms (Other than Capital Goods)                     
R11.2  Against C+E1/E2 Forms                     
Total A4 from 
Annexure 
  
119
Figure B.3: Page 3 - Form 16
Page 3 of 10 
R11.3  Inward/outward Stock Transfer ( Branch) 
 against F Forms 
R11.4  Inward/outward Stock Transfer (Consignment) 
 against F Forms 
R11.5 Own goods received/transferred after job work 
 against F Forms 
R11.6  Other dealers goods received/returned after job 
 work against F Forms 
R11.7 Against H Forms (other than Delhi dealers) 
R11.8 Against I Forms 
R11.9 Against J Forms 
R11.10 Exports to / Imports from outside India 
R11.11 Sale of Exempted Goods (Schedule I) 
R11.12 High Sea Sales/Purchases 
R11.13 Sale/Purchases without Forms 
R11.14 Capital goods purchased against C Form 
R11.15 Total 
R12 Verification 
I/We __________________________________________ hereby solemnly affirm and declare that the information given 
hereinabove is true and correct to the best of my/our knowledge and belief and nothing has been concealed there from. 
Signature of Authorised Signatory _____________________________________________________________ 
Full Name   (first name, middle, surname) _____________________________________________________________ 
Designation/Status _____________________________________________________________ 
Place 
Date 
Day Month Year 
Instructions for filling Return Form: 
1. Please complete all the applicable fields in the Form.
2. The fields, which are not applicable, may be left blank.
3. Return should be filed electronically, on the departmental website, within the stipulated period as prescribed
under rule 28 of the DVAT Rules.
4. Transmit (i) quarter wise and invoice wise Purchase and Sales data maintained in Form DVAT-30 & 31 OR
(ii) quarter wise and dealer wise summary of purchase and sales in Annexure-2A & 2B appended to this
Form. Purchase/Sale made from un-registered dealers may be entered in one row for a quarter.  However,
sale detail of goods sold to Embassies/Organizations specified in Sixth Schedule should be reported invoice
wise in case opted for Form DVAT-30 & 31 or Embassies/Organizations wise, if opted for Annexure 2A & 2B,
as the case may be.
5. In case of refund, the information in Annexure -2E appended to this Form should be furnished electronically,
on departmental website, at the time of filing online return.
6. All dealers to file tax rate wise details of closing stock in hand as on 31
st
 March, with the second quarter
return of the following year, in Annexure 1D
7. Transmit the information relating to issue of  debit/credit note in  Annexure 2C & 2D.
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B.2 Annexures
Figure B.4: Annexure 2a - Form 16
Annexure – 2A 
(See instruction 6) 
SUMMARY OF PURCHASE / INWARD BRANCH TRANSFER REGISTER 
(Quarter wise) 
(To be filed along with return) 
TIN: Name of the 
Dealer: 
 Purchase for the Tax Period: From _______   to   _______ 
Summary of Purchase (As per DVAT-30) 
(All amounts in Rupees) 
Sr. No. Quarter & 
Year 
Seller’s TIN Seller’s Name Rate of Tax  under DVAT Act
(for all columns) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Inter-State Purchase/Stock Transfer/Import not eligible for credit of input tax 
Import 
from 
Outside 
India 
High 
Sea 
Purchas
e 
Capital 
Goods 
purchased 
against C-
Forms 
Goods (Other 
than capital 
goods) 
purchased 
against C-Form 
s 
Purchase 
against H-
Form (other 
than Delhi 
dealers) 
Purchases 
without 
Forms 
Inward 
Stock 
Transfer 
(Branch) 
against F-
Form 
Inward Stock 
Transfer 
(Consignment
) against F-
Form 
Own 
goods 
receiv
ed 
back 
after 
job 
work 
again
st F-
Form 
Other dealers 
goods received 
for  job work 
against F-Form 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Local Purchases  not eligible for credit of input tax 
Purchase 
From 
Unregistere
d dealer 
Purchases 
from 
Compositio
n Dealer 
Purchase 
of Non-
creditable 
goods(Sc
hedule-
VII) 
Purchas
e of Tax 
free 
goods 
Purchase 
of labour 
& 
services 
related 
to Works 
Contract 
Purchase 
against tax 
invoices not 
eligible for ITC 
* 
Purchase of 
Goods 
against 
retail 
invoices 
Purchase of 
Petrol & 
Diesel from 
Oil Marketing 
Companies in 
Delhi 
Purchase 
from Delhi 
dealers 
against Form-
H 
Purchase of 
Capital Goods 
(Used for 
manufacturin
g of non-
creditable 
goods) 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Local Purchases eligible to credit of input tax 
Capital Goods Others (Goods) Others (Works Contract) 
Purchase Amount 
(excluding VAT) 
Input Tax 
Paid 
Purchase Amount 
(excluding VAT) 
Input Tax 
Paid 
Purchase Amount 
(excluding VAT) 
Input Tax Paid 
26 27 28 29 30 31 
Note: - Data in respect of unregistered dealers may be consolidated tax rate wise for each 
Quarter.  
* will include purchase of DEPB (for self-consumption), consumables goods & raw material
used for manufacturing   of tax free goods in Column No.21.
Signature of Dealer / 
Authorized Signatory 
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Figure B.5: Annexure 2b - Form 16
Annexure – 2B 
(See instruction 6) 
SUMMARY OF SALE / OUTWARD BRANCH TRANSFER REGISTER 
(Quarter wise) 
(To be filed along with return) 
TIN:  Name of the Dealer: 
Address:  Sale for the Tax Period: From ___ to _____ 
Summary of Sales (As per DVAT-31) 
(All amounts in Rupees) 
Sr No. Quarter & Year Buyer’s TIN / 
Embassy/Organisation 
Regn. No. 
Buyer/Embassy/Organisation 
Name 
Tax Rate (DVAT) 
(for all columns) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Turnover of Inter-State Sale/Stock Transfer / Export (Deductions) 
Expor
t 
Hig
h 
Sea 
Sale 
Own 
goods 
transferre
d  for Job 
Work 
against F-
Form 
Other 
dealers’ 
goods 
returned 
after Job 
work 
against F-
Form 
Stock 
transfer 
(Branch
) 
against 
F- Form
Stock 
transfer 
(Consignme
nt) against 
F- Form
Sale 
against 
H-Form
Sale 
agains
t I-
Form 
Sale 
agains
t J-
Form 
Sale 
against 
C+E-
I/E-II 
Sale 
of 
Exe
mpte
d 
Goo
ds 
[Sch. 
I] 
Sale
s 
cover
ed 
unde
r 
provi
so to 
[Sec.
9(1)] 
Read 
with 
Sec.
8(4)] 
Sale
s of 
Good
s 
Outsi
de 
Delhi 
(Sec.
4) 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Turnover of Inter-State Sale (Taxable) Turnover of Local Sale 
Rate of 
Tax 
(CST) 
Sale against 
C-Form
excluding sale 
of capital 
assets 
Capital 
Goods sold 
against C- 
Forms 
Sale 
witho
ut 
forms 
Tax 
(CST
) 
Turnove
r 
(Goods) 
(excludi
ng 
VAT) 
Turno
ver 
(WC) 
(exclu
ding 
VAT 
Out
put 
Tax 
Charges 
towards 
labour, 
services 
and other 
like 
charges, 
in civil 
works 
Charges 
towards 
cost of 
land, if 
any, in 
civil 
works 
contracts 
Sale 
agai
nst 
H-
For
m to 
Delh
i 
deal
ers 
Sale of 
Petrol/Di
esel 
suffered 
tax on 
full sale 
price at 
OMC 
level 
contracts 
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Note:- Data in respect of unregistered dealers may be consolidated tax rate wise for each 
Quarter. Data of Embassies/Organisations listed in Sixth Schedule shall be provided entity 
wise. 
Signature of Dealer / 
Authorized Signatory 
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